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LIKE A NATION STATE
Douglas A. Kysar
Bernadette A. Meyler
Using California's self-consciously internationalist approach to climate
change regulation as a primary example, this Article examines constitutional
limitations on state foreign affairs activities. In particular, by focusing on the
prospect of California's establishment of a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
trading system and its eventual linkage with comparable systems in Europe and
elsewhere, this Article demonstrates that certain constitutional objections to
extrajurisdictional linkage of state GHG emissions trading systems and the
response that these objections necessitate may be more complicated than previously
appreciated. First, in order to successfully combat the argument that state-level
climate change activities interfere with a federal executive position of withholding
binding domestic GHG emissions reductions in advance of a multilateral
agreement including key developing nations, states must demonstrate that the
executive branch is not acting with congressional support and has, furthermore,
declared its position too informally to constitute an exercise of any of the president's
independent constitutional powers. Second, state efforts to link GHG emissions
trading systems with those of other nations may face serious challenges under the
foreign affairs and Foreign Commerce Clause doctrines. Finally, states' efforts to
integrate with other trading schemes or to otherwise protect the integrity of their
own trading schemes must be carefully constructed lest they invite challenge as
being discriminatory or overreaching, in light of more conventional dormant
Commerce Clause constraints on state regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
To some observers, Arnold Schwarzenegger only became an action
hero on July 31, 2006. On that day, the 38th governor of California,
flanked by then Prime Minister Tony Blair and a handful of global business
leaders, announced to the world that his state was no longer content to serve
only a quasi-sovereign role: "California is a great part of the United States,
but we happen to be a leading state with a huge economy, and we are, like
I say, a nation state."' What's more, Governor Schwarzenegger emphasized
that, as a "nation state," California maintains its own foreign policy, one that
differs dramatically from the federal government's with respect to climate
change. Whereas the federal executive branch has, under George W.
Bush, held back from acting in the belief that strong domestic legal efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would forfeit valuable bargaining
chips in international climate negotiations, Schwarzenegger has adopted the
contrary goal of setting an example on the world stage through advance
action. With the full support of the California state legislature, Governor
Schwarzenegger has sought to "show leadership" by taking numerous steps
to reduce California's GHG emissions, irrespective of whether other major
emitters concurrently agree to follow suit According to the governor of
the nation's most populous state-the executive overseeing an economy that
would rank fifth in size in the world if California were actually a nation
state-the scientific debate on climate change is officially over4 and the
moral case for legal action is so straightforward that a worldwide film
1. Governor's Remarks, Office of the Governor of the State of Cal., Gov. Schwarzenegger,
British Prime Minister Tony Blair Sign Historic Agreement to Collaborate on Climate
Change, Clean Energy (July 31, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/print-
version/speech/2918. Governor Schwarzenegger in turn cites Tony Blair as his own "action
hero" for inspiring him to commit to ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction goals for the
state of California. See Andrew Grice, Blair Hails "Historic Day" in the Battle Against Climate
Change, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 14, 2007, Supplement, at 2.
2. Governor's Remarks, supra note 1.
3. See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, State and Local Net Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Reduction Programs, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/states.cfm?ID=51 (last visited
Mar. 8, 2008).
4. Cf. Governor's Remarks, supra note 1 (noting remarks of Steve Howard, chief executive
officer of the Climate Group, stating that Schwarzenegger "said the debate is over in such a
compelling way... [that] the Governor will go down in history as The Emissions Terminator").
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audience should immediately grasp its plotline: "[We have the responsibility
to our people and to the rest of the world that we take care of our environ-
ment, and since we know there is global warming... we should stop it."'
The only potential obstacle to the unfolding of Governor Schwarzenegger's
plotline is its constitutionality, for the deliberately extrajurisdictional focus of
California's climate change activities seems difficult to square with the
familiar refrain that, in U.S. foreign relations, subnational governments have
essentially no role to play;6 they, in fact, "disappear."7 Nevertheless, operating
under the assumption that, "when [California] act[s], the world takes notice
and it has tremendous impact,"' California has adopted a climate change
strategy that avowedly depends on the successful exportation of its policies to
other states and other nations for California itself to avoid a potentially
ruinous unilateral GHG disarmament. To be clear, no one in California
is under the illusion that the state can address global climate change
adequately on its own; instead, the very premise of California's climate
change policy is that the state will be able to inspire, cajole, and
cooperate with other political jurisdictions in order to achieve a coordi-
nated solution. In light of that aim, how can California's climate change
stance be reconciled with the supposedly "irrefutable postulate that[,]
though the states were several[,] their people in respect of foreign affairs
were one?"9 If "[t]here is no question ... that [states] would be prohibited
5. Id. Such bold proclamations abound. Speaking to the 75th annual meeting of the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, Governor Schwarzenegger emphasized that he and his fellow subnational
officials were "not waiting for Washington." Governor's Remarks, Office of the Governor of the
State of Cal., Governor Speaks at U.S. Conference of Mayors 75th Annual Meeting (June 23, 2007),
available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/print-version/speech/6772. As a result, he proudly
proclaimed, "We are the ones that are leading the fight against global warming. We are the
ones that are creating an American policy that will inspire the rest of the world to join us and
to become partners with us, and we are the ones that will ensure a brighter tomorrow for the
people, and a brighter tomorrow for our planet." Id. Similarly, writing in the Washington Post
with Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell, Schwarzenegger argued, "It's high time the federal
government becomes our partner or gets out of the way." Arnold Schwarzenegger & Jodi Rell,
Lead or Step Aside, EPA, WASH. POST, May 21, 2007, at A13.
6. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
150 (2d ed. 1996) ("At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards
U.S. foreign relations, the states 'do not exist."').
7. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("[l~n respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes, the state. .. does not exist.").
8. Governor's Remarks, supra note 1.
9. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936); see also Am. Ins.
Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) ("There is... no question that at some point an
exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government's
policy, given the 'concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations'
that animated the Constitution's allocation of the foreign relations power to the National
Government in the first place.") (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427
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from directly entering into negotiations with foreign nations in an attempt to
establish reciprocal greenhouse gas emissions limitations,"'" then how can the
various climate change initiatives pursued by California be so patently
multilateral in their aspirations?
To date, several scholars have concluded that subnational climate
change initiatives such as those pursued by California generally do pass
constitutional muster, notwithstanding frequent judicial declarations of the
federal government's "one voice" in foreign relations." Such analyses,
however, focus on only a selection of state and local climate change policies
from among the vast number and variety of such policies being pursued, many
n.25 (1964)); Japan Line Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (recognizing "the
Framers' overriding concern that 'the Federal Government must speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments') (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (holding unconstitutional
"state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations--matters which the Constitution
entrusts solely to the Federal Government"); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)
("Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government
exclusively."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ("The Federal Government, representing
as it does the collective interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive
responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties."). For numerous similar examples,
see Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49
DUKE L.J. 1127, 1221 n.331 (2000).
10. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
293, 321 (2005).
11. See, e.g., David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to
Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 79, 81 (2003) (addressing a wide variety
of state and local GHG initiatives and concluding broadly that "there is simply no federalism
concern here" and that "from all constitutional perspectives, it is constitutional for states to react to
risks of global warming, or to think globally but act locally"); Merrill, supra note 10, at 319-28
(analyzing foreign policy preemption objections to climate change public nuisance litigation and
concluding that "the dormant foreign policy preemption argument should fail"); Note, Foreign
Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1877, 1877
(2006) [hereinafter Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption] ("[Miandatory state limits on GHGs are
not preempted by the federal foreign affairs power."). For additional analyses of constitutional issues
raised by subnational regulation of greenhouse gases, see Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change,
Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIz L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1081664; Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and
the Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10653 (2007) (providing a "practical road map for
California and other states attempting to reduce [GHG] emissions without violating the dictates
of the Constitution"); Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States:
A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005); Michael A. Mehling, Bridging the
Transatlantic Divide: Legal Aspects of a Link Between Regional Carbon Markets in Europe and
the United States, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 46 (2007); Brian H. Potts, Regulating
Greenhouse Gas 'Leakage': How California Can Evade the Impending Constitutional Attacks,
ELECTRICITY J., June 2006, at 43; Claire Carothers, Note, United We Stand: The Interstate Compact
as a Tool for Effecting Climate Change, 41 GA. L. REV. 229 (2006); Yvonne Gross, Note, Kyoto,
Congress, or Bust: The Constitutional Invalidity of State CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs, 28 THOMAS
JEFFERSON L. REV. 205 (2005).
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of which pose distinct constitutional challenges. Moreover, the analyses
must necessarily depend on assuming debatable positions within notoriously
underdetermined areas of constitutional law, including various restrictions on
state foreign affairs activities that emanate from the Treaty Clause, the
Compact Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the foreign affairs
preemption doctrine. Although unsatisfying, the safest conclusion to draw in
this context is that the recent foreign affairs activities of state and local
governments exist in a constitutional fog, similar in many respects to the dim
doctrinal haze that covers the interbranch distribution of foreign affairs
authority at the federal level. 2
In this Article, we seek to highlight a portion of the terrain underlying
this fog. Using the prospect of states' linkage of their developing GHG
emissions trading schemes with those of foreign nations as a primary example,
this Article examines several serious but underappreciated constitutional
objections to state-level climate multilateralism. In particular, piecemeal
integration of state-level climate change policies might be challenged as
interfering with a purported federal government policy of withholding
domestic legal action on GHG emissions in order to maximize the bargaining
chips available for international climate negotiations, an argument that the
Court has, on occasion, been receptive to when presented by the federal
executive branch. The effort by state actors to link their climate change
policies with those of other jurisdictions also might be challenged as
encouraging states to discriminate against other jurisdictions, to sit in
judgment upon them, or to exert a coercive influence over their regulatory
choices, situations that the Court has shown willingness to avert through
invocation of the Commerce Clause and of foreign affairs preemption.
As we show, both of these forms of objection to extrajurisdictional linkage of
state GHG emissions trading systems are more complicated and require
more serious consideration than generally appreciated.
Although we focus on the specific case of potential integration of state
GHG emissions trading schemes in this Article, we do so knowing that
the example may prove to be of fleeting relevance. Legal developments
in the area of climate change have, in recent years, occurred at a rapid
pace. As with other features of state and local climate change programs, a
state GHG emissions trading system could be expressly preempted at
12. See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 436 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("'One is compelled to
conclude that there are agreements which the President can make on his sole authority and others
which he can make only with the consent of the Senate (or of both houses), but neither Justice
Sutherland ... nor any one else has told us which are which."' (quoting HENKIN, supra note 6, at 222)).
Like a Nation State 1625
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any moment by Congress, whether or not the system has been integrated
internationally. 3 Our analysis, however, will remain pertinent even if state
GHG emissions trading turns out to be a temporary step on the road to a
national or global trading system. Climate change is only the most salient
and intractable of international environmental dilemmas at present;
other significant challenges, such as conventional air pollution regulation,
biodiversity preservation, water resource management, desertification, hazardous
waste disposal, and toxic chemical regulation will continue to evince a substan-
tial need for coordinated multijurisdictional action.'4 Such challenges also
will, no doubt, attract the attention of subnational governments, particularly
those whose progressive populaces insist on the mantra "think globally, act
locally." As Julian Ku recently noted, the forces of globalization that have
bound citizens together in webs of economic, cultural, and technological
interdependence also have made possible the intervention by those citizens
into global affairs at subnational political levels. 5 This localization of the
global will not be undone. Accordingly, our analysis will remain relevant
even as the substance of state and local foreign affairs activities shifts in
unforeseeable ways.
We also wish to stress that this Article offers an analysis of constitutional
objections to subnational climate change regulation from within the existing
doctrinal framework, rather than a normative argument about whether state
or federal governments provide the most appropriate or effective locus of legal
authority for resolving international environmental conundrums. 6 As recent
13. The system also could be displaced by less direct federal activity, as appears to have
happened late last year when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used newly passed federal
fuel economy standards as a ground for denying California's waiver request under the Clean Air Act
to regulate GHG emissions from mobile sources. See infra note 24.
14. See Douglas Kysar & Ya-Wei Li, Regulating From Nowhere: Domestic Environmental Law
and the Nation-State Subject, in 2 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES: LAW
AND GOVERNANCE (Beverly Crawford ed.) (forthcoming 2008).
15. See Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2412-14 (2006).
Writing from a very different vantage point, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have also affirmed
the increasing relation between the local and the global, one that they believe may displace the
nation state. According to Hardt and Negri, "each struggle, though firmly rooted in local conditions,
leaps immediately to the global level." MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 56 (2000).
16. For such a normative account, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The
Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007) (maintaining that "subnational
state-level action is not the best way to combat global climate change" because "local action is not
well suited to regulating mobile global conduct yielding a global externality"). A large body of
literature has addressed the more general question of whether state and local participation in foreign
affairs is normatively desirable. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign
Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 829 (1989) (arguing that, "[to the extent that state and local
actions express citizen and community views, raise public consciousness and add to robust debate
on important public policies, they serve an important public function"); Martin S. Flaherty,
1626 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1621 (2008)
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analyses have demonstrated, the federalism debate within environmental law
has tended to rely on an unduly rigid demarcation between state and federal
authority. 7 Detailed historical analysis of the actual development of
environmental law regimes reveals a much more complex arrangement, in
which state and federal lawmakers and regulators operate in an iterative
fashion, learning from each other's successes and mistakes, prodding each
other in formal and informal ways to action, and generally engaging in
dialectical, rather than atomized, communications and activities. California,
as the longtime bellwether jurisdiction for environmentalism within the
United States, has played an especially significant role within this process of
iterative federalism. Thus, even if one agrees with commentators that an
effective global climate change policy regime must be one of coordinated
national action," a further normative question remains as to whether, within
any particular nation, such action best emerges from a strong, top-down
federal authority, from a more organic, bottom-up process of state experimenta-
tion, or from some fruitful hybrid of both approaches.' 9 To the extent that
our analysis bears on this debate, it does so in the sense that constitutional
objections may limit the degree to which state action is permissible in
the arena of international environmental problems, even assuming that
it is desirable.
Part I provides background information on state and local climate
change institutions, with special attention to the prospect of subnational
GHG emissions trading programs being established and linked for cross-
jurisdictional trading in advance of national legislation. As Governor
Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277
(1999) (contending that the Supreme Court's federalist revival poses a significant and undesirable
threat to national supremacy in foreign affairs); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs,
and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1622-23 (1997) (advancing the claim that "as the category
of foreign relations comes to include matters traditionally regulated by states in which the states
have a genuine interest, prevailing understandings of American federalism require that the decision
to regulate these matters by federal law be made through political deliberations in which the states
have a voice"); Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on the
Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1028 (2001) ("[Allthough tensions between state
and federal policies do emerge periodically, state activities often benefit the Nation."); Ku, supra
note 15, at 2414 ("[A] system of gubernatorial foreign policy is the most practical and feasible way to
accommodate the internationalizing pressure of globalization with the traditional conception of
federalism still extant in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.").
17. See Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change (UCLA Sch. of Law Research
Paper No. 08-09, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l 115556; see
also David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper.No. 07-23, 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1016767.
18. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 16.
19. See Carlson, supra note 17.
1627
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Schwarzenegger explains, regional and international alliances of that nature
"are sending the world a message, and what we are saying is basically that we
are going to change the dynamic on greenhouse gas and carbon emissions,
and that we are taking actions ourselves, and we are not waiting for
Washington.""0 The remainder of the Article examines constitutional
uncertainties associated with this plan of action. Part 11 observes that Governor
Schwarzenegger's vision of the bottom-up linkage of various emerging
GHG emissions trading systems is in tension with the federal executive
branch's apparent objection to domestic legal action in advance of a comprehen-
sive, top-down international solution. Parts III and IV then evaluate
whether GHG emissions trading integration would either so fundamentally
implicate a state in the evaluation of other nations' internal affairs as
to threaten the federal government's "one voice" on matters of foreign
policy or would necessitate impermissible discrimination against or burdening
of out-of-state commerce.
I. TO BUILD A MARKET: CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY INTEGRATION
California's actions on climate change are emblematic of a more general
push by subnational governments within the United States to regulate GHG
emissions." Whether via common law liability actions," more conventional
environmental lawsuits seeking to enforce federal agency obligations," direct
20. Governor's Remarks, supra note 5.
21. See, e.g., BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS
OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004); John Dembach, Moving the Climate Change Debate
From Models to Proposed Legislation: Lessons From State Experience, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10933 (2000);
Engel, supra note 11; Hodas, supra note 11; Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State Climate Change
Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 46 (2004); Carolyn Kousky &
Stephen H. Schneider, Global Climate Policy: Will Cities Lead the Way?, 3 CLIMATE POL'Y 359
(2003); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and
Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12
PENN. ST. ENVFL. L REV. 15 (2004); Merrill, supra note 10; Wiener, supra note 16. A catalogue of such
initiatives can be found at Pew Center on Global Climate Change, What's Being Done ... In
the States, http://www.pewclimate.org/whatsbeing-done/in the states (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
22. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(dismissing federal common law nuisance action brought by a coalition of states and nongovernmental
organizations against major GHG emitters); Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment,
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-05755 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006)
(bringing common law liability claim against major automakers).
23. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (finding that the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts has standing to challenge the EPA's failure to regulate mobile sources of GHG
emissions and that the agency has statutory authority to regulate such emissions under the Clean Air
Act); Coke Oven Envtl. Task Force v. EPA, No. 06-1182, 2007 WL 707329 (D.C. Cit. June 23,
2006) (challenging the EPA's failure to regulate stationary sources of GHG emissions under the
Clean Air Act).
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regulation of mobile24 and stationary25 GHG emitters, adoption of renewable
energy portfolio standards, 26 mayoral commitment to GHG emissions• 2"7
reductions, or a variety of other efforts, state and local governments
have proven to be the most active and aggressive sources of legal action on
climate change in the United States. With the Bush Administration
demonstrating skepticism about climate change science and an unwillingness to
support binding emissions limits, and with Congress generally neglecting
to step into the void because of its longstanding view that developing nations
21must be included as part of any significant effort to address GHG emissions,
24. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43018.5 (West 2007). This 2002 Act requires the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) to "develop and adopt regulations that achieve
the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles."
Id. In September 2004, CARB approved regulatory amendments to California's existing motor
vehicle standards that required compliance by automakers with new vehicle emissions limits
for carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons beginning in the 2009 model
year. Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Fact Sheet: Climate Change Emission Control
Regulations (Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/factsheets/cc-newfs.pdf. Under section
209 of the federal Clean Air Act, any such state motor vehicle emissions regulation is preempted
unless issued by a state that had already adopted emissions control standards prior to March 30, 1966,
and unless the state is granted a waiver by the EPA. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2000).
California, as the only state eligible for this exemption, has historically received waivers from the
EPA on a routine basis, an authorization that then enables any other state to adopt regulations
identical to California's more protective standards. Nevertheless, after a contentious two-year
negotiating process-during which the Supreme Court issued its dramatic opinion in Massachusetts v.
EPA and two federal district courts cleared the way for state regulation of motor vehicle GHG
emissions by denying industry preemption challenges to the California regulations based on the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act-the EPA ultimately denied California's waiver request. See
Carlson, supra note 17, at 30.
25. For instance, the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, A.B. 32,
2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Session (Cal. 2006) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-
38599 (West Supp. 2008)), requires the state to achieve a 25 percent reduction in its GHG emissions by
2020. By executive order, Schwarzenegger also has committed the state to reducing its emissions
to 80 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2050. See Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (2005), available
at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/energy/ExecOrderS-3-05.htm. Similarly, Maine passed legislation in
2003 that requires the state to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by 2010, and then to
90 percent of 1990 levels by 2020. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 §§ 574-789 (Supp. 2007).
26. See Engel, supra note 11, at 56 (observing that state renewable portfolio standards might
collectively reduce U.S. emissions by 1 to 1.5 percent below "business as usual" levels by 2015-2020).
27. More than 800 mayors in communities representing more than seventy-seven million
individuals signed the U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, under which they
agreed to reduce GHG emissions in their communities by 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. See
Mayors Climate Protecting Center, List of Participating Mayors, http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/
list.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
28. This view was most prominently expressed in the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which was
passed by a 95-0 vote of the U.S. Senate and which declared that body's intention to reject any
treaty or other agreement requiring Senate approval that did not include a binding GHG emissions
schedule for developing nations or that "would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
States." Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). In 2005, the Senate's stance
softened somewhat, with the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act
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officials in subnational positions have increasingly sought to fill the
leadership vacuum. As David Hodas observes, the resulting contrast between
the apparent position of the federal government on climate change and the
percolating activities of state and local governments is sufficiently dramatic
that it suggests a rupture in our political unity: "It is as though we live in
two different countries."29
As noted above, Governor Schwarzenegger wholeheartedly agrees with
this assessment and has sought to position California as a "nation state"3°
on the international stage with respect to climate change. When it passed
the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (Assembly Bill No.
32 (A.B. 32)), the California state legislature concurred with Governor
Schwarzenegger's ambitious vision. This landmark legislation directs the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) to adopt regulations that require
the reporting and verification of statewide GHG emissions and to
develop compliance mechanisms that achieve a reduction of statewide
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020.' In the findings and
declarations section of A.B. 32, the California legislature announced an
intention to "plac[e] California at the forefront of national and
international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases," and to
assume a "global leadership role" by "encouraging other states, the federal
government, and other countries to act"32 rather than waiting for
multilateral consensus. The self-consciously internationalist nature of
California's climate change policy is further underscored in A.B. 32 by the
statute's requirements that CARB promote consistency among GHG emissions
attracting thirty-eight votes and a new resolution calling for a mandatory national emissions cap
receiving fifty-four votes. See Wiener, supra note 16, at 1963 n.9. The latter statement, dubbed the
Bingaman-Domenici Resolution, still indicated that any national legislation must "not significantly
harm the United States economy" and must "encourage comparable action by other nations that are
major trading partners and key contributors to global warming." 151 Cong. Rec. S7037 (2005). As
of the writing of this Article, numerous climate-related bills were being debated in Congress, most of
which linked domestic legislative action with a need to pursue comparable restrictions on other
nations. See, e.g., H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE & SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND
AIR QUALITY, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: COMPETITIVENESS
CONCERNS/ENGAGING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2008) [hereinafter H.R. COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE], available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/climate..change/white_
paper.competitiveness.013108.pdf ("[P]ast action on climate change suggests that Congress would
be unlikely to adopt legislation committing the U.S. to reduce its GHG emission limits without
action by developing countries as well.").
29. Hodas, supra note 11, at 53.
30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West Supp. 2008).
32. Id. § 38501.
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reporting regimes throughout the world,33 that it consider other state, local, and
national GHG reduction measures when developing its own program,3
4
and, more broadly, that it "consult with other states, and the federal govern-
ment, and other nations to identify the most effective strategies and methods
to reduce greenhouse gases, [to] manage GHG control programs, and to
facilitate the development of integrated and cost-effective regional,
",35
national, and international GHG reduction programs.
In an executive order implementing this legislation, Governor
Schwarzenegger expressly directed state officials to develop a market-
based GHG emissions reduction program that would permit linkages with
other significant programs throughout the world, especially the most
well-developed of such schemes to date, the cap-and-trade GHG emissions
program of the European Union.36 Known as the Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS), this program involves, in broad outline, the imposition of
GHG emissions caps on multiple sectors, such as electricity generation
and transportation, by member governments, along with the establishment
of an EU-wide emissions allowance registry through which actors can buy
and sell permits. In such cap-and-trade schemes for GHG emissions, permits
are typically issued in units of carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions, with other
GHG contributors being converted into CO 2 equivalent emissions factors
based on their relative global warming potential.
In order to help fulfill the goal of integration, Governor Schwarzenegger
directed the state's secretary for environmental protection to appoint a Market
Advisory Committee to provide guidance to CARB in implementing A.B.
32." On June 30, 2007, the Committee released its report, Recommendations
for Designing a Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade System for California, which
documented several challenges facing the construction of any GHG emissions
trading program, as well as additional issues associated with linking
California's eventual program to other systems such as the EU-ETS.' As the
33. Id. § 38530(c)(2).
34. Id. § 38561(c).
35. Id. § 38564.
36. See Cal. Exec. Order No. S-20-06 (2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/executive-
order/4484; see also Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 10653 ("Although [A.B. 32] does not
directly call upon [CARB] to use market-based solutions to reduce emissions, it seems that [CARB],
along with many of California's leaders, prefers a cap-and-trade program over other alternatives.").
37. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Announces
Executive Order (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/4447.
38. MKT. ADVISORY COMM., CAL. AIR RES. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A
GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIA (2007), available at http://
www.climatechange.ca.gov/documents/2007-06-29_MAC_FINALREPORT.PDF [hereinafter MARKET
ADVISORY COMM.].
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report noted, the construction of a successful GHG emissions trading
program demands careful consideration of, inter alia, which greenhouse gases
to target for the cap; which sectors and activities to subject to emissions
restrictions; what overall level of emissions and schedule of reductions to set
as a basis for the cap; how to allocate permits among existing and new sources
once the cap is established; whether to give away or auction permits; whether
to allow credit for sponsorship of offsets, that is, reductions in GHG emissions
that occur outside the scope of the cap-and-trade program; whether to allow
banking or borrowing of permits between compliance periods; whether to
create a program safety valve such as the issuance of additional permits at a
predetermined price if compliance proves to be unexpectedly difficult; and
whether to credit in some fashion GHG emissions reductions that actors
undertake prior to the establishment of the system.39 Once these various
decisions have been made, the success of the cap-and-trade system then
depends on reliable monitoring and enforcement by regulators to ensure that
covered GHG emitters comply with permit requirements and that GHG
emissions actually are controlled. As the Market Advisory Committee
succinctly put it, "[monitoring is the gold standard for tradable allowances. '
Even tackling these political and administrative challenges will not
suffice to ensure the integrity of the GHG emissions trading program,
since policymakers also must consider the fact that their jurisdiction is
connected through webs of economic and environmental interdependence
with myriad other jurisdictions that follow their own climate change policies.
More so than any other environmental dilemma, climate change illustrates
the porosity of territorial borders. This is most obviously true in the
sense that GHG emissions impact global atmospheric processes irrespective
of where the emissions originate, such that environmental benefits from any
emissions reduction can be undone through increases elsewhere on the
planet. It is also true in the more subtle sense that GHG emissions limits
affect the cost of producing many goods that themselves cross jurisdictional
boundaries, such that differential climate change policies may alter existing
patterns of production and trade.
At the national level, policymakers in the United States remain deeply
concerned about the competitiveness effects of climate change regulation,
even as the prospects for a federal GHG emissions trading program have
grown brighter. Accordingly, much attention has focused recently on the
question of how to achieve the environmental objectives of GHG emissions
39. Id. at 18-78.
40. Id. at 71.
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trading without suffering adverse economic impacts from leakage-that is,
from the relocation of GHG intensive industry and manufacturing to
jurisdictions with no or lower GHG emissions standards." One frequently
discussed safeguard against leakage involves border adjustments such as tariffs,
taxes, permit purchase requirements, or other trade-related mechanisms that
seek to eliminate any cost advantage imported goods might enjoy on account
of more lax climate change policies in their country of origin.42 A more
aggressive approach would simply ban importation of goods unless they had
been produced according to regulatory standards of equal or greater
environmental stringency than those applied to domestic manufacturers.
Assuming that such defensive mechanisms withstood challenge under
international trade agreements (or under the dormant Commerce Clause if
adopted at the subnational level)," then the importing jurisdiction could
be confident that its climate change policies were not being undermined by
economic activities occurring within its borders, despite their connection
to extrajurisdictional emissions.
More desirable than border adjustments would be outright integration of
a jurisdiction's GHG emissions trading program with those of other states,
regions, and countries. As noted above, Governor Schwarzenegger holds
high hopes that California eventually will adopt a trading program that can
be linked with the EU-ETS. Indeed, the urge to integrate appears almost
irresistible in the case of GHG emissions trading. The premise of the cap-
and-trade policy approach is that a given environmental goal can be achieved
at less cost through trading than through conventional regulatory standards
because firms have varying compliance costs.44 Especially in a case such as
that of GHG emissions, in which environmental benefits are obtained largely
without regard to where reductions occur,4" policymakers ideally would
41. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 10654-59.
42. See H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 28, at 8.
43. For both international trade and dormant Commerce Clause analyses, this is a strong
assumption. See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The
Limits and Options of International Trade Law (Nicholas Inst. for Env't Policy Solutions, Duke Univ.,
Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/
intemationaltradelaw.pdf; Patricia Weisselberg, Note, Shaping the Energy Future in the American
West: Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Out-Of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants
Without Violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185 (2007).
44. MARKET ADVISORY COMM., supra note 38, at 6.
45. See H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE & SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND AIR
QUALITY, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 11 (2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
climatechange/white%20paper%20st-lcl%20roles%20final%202-22.pdf ("Unlike most air
pollutants, local [GHG] reductions alone will not help the local area given that climate change is
caused by global, rather than local, concentrations of greenhouse gases."). We say "largely" because
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require emissions reductions from those actors that can achieve reductions at
least cost. Trading approximates this ideal scenario by allowing higher cost
firms to purchase excess permits from lower cost firms, rather than being
required to undertake emissions reductions themselves. In essence, the
burden of achieving a given level of emissions reduction is allocated to those
actors best positioned to bear it. This efficiency advantage of emissions
trading programs increases with the number of sectors and firms under the
cap, since the likelihood of cost heterogeneity increases accordingly. Naturally,
linkage with the trading programs of other jurisdictions offers similar
efficiency-enhancing potential in that, through linkage, permits issued in one
jurisdiction could become exchangeable with those of another jurisdiction.
For these reasons, the Market Advisory Committee recommended that
CARB both include as many domestic sources within California's trading
scheme as practicable and seek to integrate its eventual system with other
trading schemes such as the EU-ETS.46
Like the initial construction of a trading program, however, linkage
entails a series of practically challenging and politically sensitive questions.
As the Market Advisory Committee noted, because "[tierms for linking with
other programs will need to be negotiated individually with the specific
jurisdiction(s) involved," CARB may need to establish "a formal institution
within California that evaluates other trading programs on an ongoing basis
to determine their appropriateness for linkage." 7 The most basic question
regarding appropriateness is whether the other jurisdiction has established an
overall emissions cap and schedule of reductions that is comparable to
California's scheme. Jurisdictions also must consider their respective policies
on borrowing and banking, safety valves, and other critical design features.
Comparable stringency on these various dimensions is desirable because it
reduces administrative costs by allowing permits to be exchanged between
systems on a one-for-one basis.48 It also helps to ensure regulatory effectiveness
by preventing dilution of the GHG permit currency through exchange with
many GHG emissions reductions also entail reductions in other pollutants, such as traditional
criteria air pollutants regulated under the Clear Air Act, that have more localized environmental and
human health effects. In such contexts, the normative case for emissions trading becomes
complicated by the need to take account of the distributive outcome of permit trading. See Jonathan
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes
to Control Local and Regional Permits, 28 ECOL. L.Q. 569 (2001).
46. MARKET ADVISORY COMM., supra note 38, at 69.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 71 ("Identical requirements across states and sources (as in the U.S. SO, and NO.
programs) and between the federal government and states (as with RGGI) keep[ ] transaction[ I costs
low and confidence in the market and in program compliance high. Differences in protocols
should be carefully considered and justified.").
55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1621 (2008)1634
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permits from a weaker system. In theory, jurisdictions could develop
conversion or exchange ratios to account for the differential stringency of
their systems. Such an effort, however, would entail complex judgments
regarding the relative worth of the two systems' emissions reductions targets.
For jurisdictions with a similar economic development status and similar
historical contributions to GHG concentrations, such judgments might
simply reduce to a comparison of the jurisdictions' percentage reduction
goals. For jurisdictions that are not similarly situated, however, establishing
an exchange ratio would necessitate judgments regarding how much the
jurisdictions ought to be allowed to emit as a matter of international and
intergenerational distributive equity-the very kinds of judgments that have
plagued the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change negotiations.4 9
Even if two jurisdictions establish comparable caps and related design
features, linkage still can adversely impact a trading system if one jurisdiction
fails to adequately administer its system. This is because, "[alt its core, a cap-
and-trade program is a method of tracking and accounting for [GHG]
emissions and having the costs of those emissions factored into economic
decisions."50 Hence, without rigorous monitoring and enforcement, actual
emissions levels may differ substantially from reported levels, ultimately
risking a loss of confidence in the integrity of the emissions market. For
instance, as the Market Advisory Committee noted in its report, "[d]ifferential
non-compliance penalties can affect the integrity of the overall regime, e.g.,
weak non-compliance penalties will tend to produce a weaker system, leading
to the potential for a combined regime to exceed intended caps."'" Similar
weakening could occur if one jurisdiction permits the use of offsets too
liberally or without adequate verification. In theory, offsets expand the range
of options available to regulated entities as they seek to reduce GHG
emissions, increasing the overall efficiency of the system. However, deciding
whether an offset truly reflects a reduction of GHG emissions from a business
as usual scenario requires nettlesome counterfactual judgments, about which
jurisdictions may legitimately disagree. At what pace in the absence of
regulation, for instance, would actors be expected to begin converting to
49. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675 (2008).
50. H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE & SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND AIR
QUALITY, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: SCOPE OF A CAP-AND-TRADE
PROGRAM 2 (2007), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/climate-change/white-
paper. 10307.pdf.
51. MARKET ADVISORY COMM., supra note 38, at 71.
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alternative fuels or green building design techniques? Because offsets often
take place in developing nations or other areas outside the regulating
jurisdiction, they also present significant verification challenges. Again, jurisdic-
tions may disagree on whether to accept the legitimacy of offsets based on
alliances, tensions, and other geopolitical variables that exist between
the regulating jurisdiction and the jurisdiction in which the purported
offset occurs.
Recognizing the need for careful planning and coordination in order
to maximize prospects for smooth integration of GHG emission trading
schemes, state and local actors have increasingly sought to engage their
counterparts in climate change policy discussions. Several northeastern
states, for instance, have formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) in order to develop a cap-and-trade program that would enable them
to jointly reduce carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. 2 In addition to
its full member governments, RGGI also includes as official observers
Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, the
Eastern Canadian Provinces, and New Brunswick. 3 Similarly, California
has banded together with the states of Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, and Washington, as well as the Canadian provinces of British
Columbia and Manitoba, to form the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). 54
Members of the WCI have agreed to set an overall regional GHG reduction
goal, to establish a "market-based program, such as a load-based cap and
trade program," to achieve the regional GHG reduction goal, and to
participate in a multistate GHG registry to enable tracking, management,
and crediting for entities that reduce GHG emissions.55 Likewise, in the
52. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), http://www.rggi.org (last visited Mar.
14, 2008).
53. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), Participating States, http://www.rggi.org/
states (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
54. See Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last visited
Mar. 14, 2008).
55. Press Release, Western Climate Initiative, Five Western Governors Announce
Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://
www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/0104F12774.pdf; see also Press Release,
Office of the Governor of the State of Cal., Governor Schwarzenegger Applauds Nine Midwest
States for Creating Regional Climate Partnership (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/
index.php?/print-version/press-release/8109 (noting that Utah and the provinces of Manitoba and
British Columbia have joined the WCI). Again, California has been particularly aggressive in
pursuing cooperative regulatory arrangements with other jurisdictions. In addition to the WCI,
California also has signed memoranda of understanding regarding climate change regulatory
coordination with Great Britain, the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Ontario, and the
Australian state of Victoria. See sources cited infra note 62. Although these agreements typically
state that they are "not intended to create any legally binding rights or obligations, and will not be
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Midwest, nine governors and the premier of Manitoba recently signed an
agreement modeled on the RGGI and WCI alliances, 6 raising the obvious
prospect of linking the various regional initiatives into a single GHG
emissions trading market that would cover a large portion of North America.
Such efforts are complemented by the Climate Registry, an emerging effort by
numerous states, provinces, and tribes to develop and manage a common
GHG reporting system.57 Finally, a coalition of European Union countries,
U.S. states, and Canadian provinces have formed the International Carbon
Action Partnership (ICAP), an international forum within which govern-
ments have agreed to share their expertise on GHG regulation and seek to
"develop a well-functioning global cap and trade carbon market."58
II. CASUAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS: FORMALITY, BARGAINING CHIPS,
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Much of the extrajurisdictional activity of states in the climate change
arena has taken the shape of memoranda of understanding, joint statements
of purpose, commitments to collaborate, and other informal multilateral
relations. 9 Indeed, even the unequivocally hard law of A.B. 32 equivocates
on the details and binding quality of its internationalist dimensions,
suggesting something more along the lines of soft international lawmaking
at the state level. Similarly, at the federal level, much of the Bush
Administration's expression of its climate change stance has consisted of
policy memoranda, amicus briefs, speeches, and other devices that fall short
of formal executive action." In both cases, the casualness of the foreign
affairs activity can be understood as an attempt to maximize the position of
the relevant government actor within the constitutional framework. State
enforceable in any court of law," they nevertheless evince a strong commitment to "the leadership
role of sub-national jurisdictions in driving global climate change solutions." Memorandum of
Understanding Between the State of Victoria and the State of California for Collaboration
on Climate Change Action (May 4, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/070506_
climate-change-document.pdf. For a similar arrangement between Florida and Germany,
see Partnership on Global Climate Change Action Between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the State of Florida (July 13, 2007), available at http://fsec.ucf.edu/en/media/enews/2007/pdf/
20070713-FRG-FL-parnership.pdf (establishing a "partnership" on global climate change
action between Florida and Germany, as detailed through a "Joint Declaration of Intent").
56. See Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://
www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid= 12497.
57. See The Climate Registry, http://www.theclimateregistry.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
58. See Frequently Asked Questions About the International Carbon Action Partnership
(ICAP) 1 (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.icap-carbonaction.condocs/icap-faqs.pdf.
59. See supra note 55.
60. See Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
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actors keen on influencing the global climate change debate have structured
their activities in ways that seem designed to avoid raising problems under
the Treaty and Compact Clauses, while still pursuing meaningful multilateral
coordination of climate change regulations." Just as firms invoke "best
practices" and "industry standards" in order to circumvent competition law
restrictions on their coordinated behavior, states seem to be adopting similar
models of cooperation in order to avoid running afoul of the federal govern-
ment's exclusive hold on foreign affairs.62 Conversely, the federal executive
branch has sought maximum preemptive force for its policy of nonaction;
lacking a statute, treaty, or executive agreement regarding climate change
that might more explicitly displace state activities, the Bush Administration
and its supporters instead have tried to elevate their all-or-nothing
negotiating strategy into an express policy that would have the effect of
preempting inconsistent state and local activities."
61. See Engel, supra note 11, at 75 (suggesting that the largely voluntary nature of state and
local climate change action "could demonstrate upfront compliance with the Compact Clause");
Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1958, 1979
(2007) (concluding that the Memorandum of Understanding establishing RGGI should survive
Compact Clause challenge).
62." See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Washington and the
Province of British Columbia on Pacific Coast Collaboration to Protect Our Shared Climate and
Ocean (June 2007), available at http://www.maritimeawards.ca/OGCWC/Docs/Agreements/
BCWACAO_Agreement.pdf ("Action on our Shared Pacific Ocean: II. Washington and British
Columbia commit to work together to:.. . B. Share best practices on protecting marine habitats
off our coasts."); Partnership on Global Climate Change Action Between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the State of Florida, supra note 55 ("The purpose of this statement is to outline an
aggressive agenda for partnership that supports the climate policies of each partner and provides
mutual economic benefits to the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Florida.");
Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Victoria and the State of California for
Collaboration on Climate Change Action, supra note 55 ("This MOU ... recognises the value of
collaboration in pursuing best-practices policies and technologies for greenhouse gas emissions
reduction and adaptation to climate change."). Cf. David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
294, 294, 313 (2006) (explaining the rise in the use of the "best practices" model by administrative
agencies and attributing its increasing popularity to "its prominence in two other areas: 1) business
management, and 2) international cooperation").
63. This approach has been similar in important respects to the Administration's attempt to
achieve preemption of state regulation and state tort law through federal agency assertion of a
conflict with federal executive branch decisions not to regulate. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, A
Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 695 (2008). Such an effort is well
illustrated by another conflict between the Bush Administration and the State of California that
revolved around the state's effort to apply Proposition 65's disclosure requirement to mercury
contaminations in seafood sold at supermarkets. In that episode, the executive branch's assertion of
preemption came in the form of a letter to the Attorney General of California, arguing that the EPA
and the Food and Drug Administration had jointly determined that point-of-sale mercury disclosure
should not be'required because consumers would potentially overreact to the information. See
Katherine Renshaw, Note, Sounding Alanas: Does Informational Regulation Help or Hinder Environmentalism?,
HeinOnline -- 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1638 2007-2008
As this Part explains, the sway that a government actor derives from
engaging in such casual foreign affairs may depend upon whether the actor is
operating on the state or federal level. Whereas state governors may manage
to circumvent constitutional limitations by expressing their international
accords in hortatory rather than mandatory tenns, the president's power to
preempt state action in the environmental arena may be limited if, acting
without congressional support, he presents only an informal foreign affairs
policy. As the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged, states have
traditionally exercised substantial powers with regard to various kinds of
environmental regulation-a history of state activity that Congress has
repeatedly condoned through the adoption of statutes that envision
concurrent regulatory authority in the environmental arena. 4 Furthermore,
the nature of climate change, in particular, demands coordinated action
by the president and Congress; hence, in the absence of contrary indications
from Congress, state efforts with respect to climate change should not be
subject to the same degree of preemption as state attempts to intervene in
spheres, like the settlement of foreign claims, that have historically been the
province of broader independent presidential power. This doctrinal
conclusion has a normative explanation: Climate change actions like those
undertaken by California on the state level, which encourage coordination
of research and regulatory efforts as well as exploration of market-based
options that could be meshed with other jurisdictions' policies, do nothing to
foreclose future supervening efforts by the federal government and should
therefore be left in place until such a time as a unified nation acts.
The president's contrary claim-that unilateral GHG emissions
reductions by states undermine the nation's ability to persuade large
developing countries to join a multilateral regime on equal terms and
therefore should be preempted 65-bears a surface resemblance to arguments
that the Court has, on occasion, accepted. For instance, in American
Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,66 the Court held that a California insurance
regulation requiring disclosure of corporate information by state-licensed
insurance companies to enable pursuit of restitution claims by Holocaust
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. J. 654,682-83,688,696 n. 203 (2006); Bob Egelko, FDA Opposing State Warnings on
Canned Tuna: Top Official Sides With Firms in Mercury Suit, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20, 2005, at Bi.
64. See Carlson, supra note 17.
65. See, e.g., EPA, Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52922, 52931 (Sept. 8, 2003) ("Unilateral EPA regulation of motor vehicle GHG emissions
could also weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the GHG intensity of
their economies."); see also Brief for the Federal Respondent, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007) (No. 05-1120).
66. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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victims and their families impermissibly interfered with federal executive
efforts to establish claim compensation mechanisms with only voluntary
corporate participation.67  Significantly, the Court found preemption
notwithstanding the lack of an express preemption clause in the execu-
tive agreements establishing Holocaust claims tribunals. Indeed, the
executive agreements appeared to expressly contemplate concurrent state
activity, in light of a tepid U.S. promise in the agreements to simply
recommend that state courts dismiss Holocaust-related lawsuits.68 Nevertheless,
the Court credited arguments by the United States as amicus curiae that
an impermissible state interference arose simply because, "if the California law
is enforceable, the President has less to offer [by way of enticement into the
voluntary claim resolution schemes] and less economic and diplomatic
leverage as a consequence. The law thus 'compromise[s] the very capacity
of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with
other governments. ''69
On first glance, one might plausibly extend this "bargaining chip
theory"7 to the climate change context, where preemptive state GHG
emissions restrictions-particularly from a substantial emitter such as
California-might seem to interfere directly with the president's chosen
strategy of promoting only voluntary GHG emissions abatement in advance
of collective international restrictions. The basic notion would be that
the federal government can, as a matter of its foreign affairs expertise,
determine that it is better to withhold domestic, legally enforced reductions
in order to threaten more effectively China, India, Brazil, and other large
emitters with the prospect of mutually assured destruction, should those
nations fail to agree to binding multilateral reductions. Thus, the story goes,
when California unilaterally binds itself to reduce GHG emissions, the federal
government's foreign affairs strategy is concomitantly weakened. In that
sense, Justice Souter's observation in Garamendi that "California seeks to
use an iron fist where the president has consistently chosen kid gloves,"
along with his statement that "the wisdom of the National Government's
policy" is not relevant in determining whether conflicting state policies are
preempted, might appear to apply not only to Holocaust claims resolution,
67. Id. at 423-25.
68. Id. at 406.
69. Id. at 424.
70. Merrill, supra note 10, at 325 ("The Court's recent foreign policy preemption cases seem
less concerned with the specific legal authority for preemption than with the general proposition that
States should not interfere with federal bargaining chips.").
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but also to climate change policy]' All that would seem to matter is that the
"iron fist" of A.B. 32 undermines the force of President Bush's preferred "kid
gloves" approach to climate change, since it suggests that significant
portions of his own country would rather bite the proverbial bullet than
continue his game of Russian Roulette. 2
This surface similarity, however, ignores the critical role played by the
president's need to derive constitutional authority for acting from either
Congress or the Constitution." The Bush Administration has relied on
Garamendi and other precedents, such as United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp." and Dames & Moore v. Regan,75 to suggest the existence of an expansive
foreign affairs power that can be exercised by the president independent of
congressional oversight, and even in contravention of Congress' ex-
pressed will." However, scholars have objected to such broad readings of
71. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 427.
72. Cf. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1187 (E.D.
Cal. 2007) ("Plaintiff's 'bargaining chip' theory of interference only makes logical sense if it would be
a rational negotiating strategy to refuse to stop pouring poison into the well from which all must
drink unless your bargaining partner agrees to do likewise.").
73. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367-68 (2008); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
74. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
75. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
76. For the invocation of independent presidential power in the foreign affairs and foreign
relations arena, see Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking,
54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 325 (2006) ("Predictably, the present administration has now seized on
Garamendi and its apparently reinvigorated ancestors as a springboard for the comprehensive claim
that the president has a discretionary and unreviewable power both to define and to compel domestic
compliance with international law."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 12, 13, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) ("[lt is the President
who is responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1963) .... In a series of cases, the Court has upheld the President's
authority to determine individual rights as part of settling disputes with foreign nations... Garamendi,
539 U.S. [at] 396... ; Dames & Moore, [453 U.S. at 680] .... The President may exercise this
dispute resolution authority without seeking the consent of the Senate or approval from
Congress... and the exercise of such authority preempts conflicting state law." (citations omitted));
Brief for the Respondents at 12, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) ("The
Constitution commits to the political branches and, in particular, the President, the responsibility for
conducting the nation's foreign affairs and military operations."); Brief for the United States as
Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 31, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No.
03-339) ("It is the 'plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations' to decide 'the important complicated,
delicate and manifold problems of foreign relations' (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20;
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414)).
A recent signing statement demonstrates the extent to which President Bush envisions his
foreign affairs power as predominating-at least in certain circumstances-even over Congress'
contrary will. When signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, which
authorizes state and local governments to divest financially from firms doing business in certain areas
of Sudan, President Bush observed that, "as the Constitution vests the exclusive authority to conduct
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Garamendi,77 and the Court itself appears to have cabined the scope of
Garamendi through its recent decision in Medellin v. Texas." In Medellin,
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion returned to the separation of powers
framework supplied by Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer79 to analyze the extent of the president's authority to
preempt state procedural default rules by implementing a decision of the
International Court of Justice interpreting the United States'
international treaty obligations.8" Medell(n thereby reinforced the
applicability of Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite framework for assessing
whether presidential action is authorized, in contrast to the more free-
floating presidential foreign affairs power seemingly present in Garamendi:
First, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.... Second, "[w]hen the President acts in absence of
foreign relations with the Federal Government, the executive branch shall construe and enforce this
legislation in a manner that does not conflict with that authority." Press Release, Office of the Press
Secretary, Statement by the President (Dec. 31, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2007/12/20071231.html. The Act itself expressly states that "[a] measure of a State or local
government authorized under [the Act] is not preempted by any Federal law or regulation." Sudan
Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516. The president's
purported reservation of authority suggests, however, that he himself might seek to overrule specific
acts of divestment by state and local governments, despite Congress' plain intent to provide detailed
and exclusive conditions for authorized divestments through the statute.
77. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48
HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 324 (2007) ("Despite [its] broad language, the Court [in Garamendi] did not
suggest that the executive had unlimited authority, even through executive agreements, to preempt
state law.") (2007); Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 912-13 (2004)
(criticizing the Court's decision in Garamendi and suggesting that it created a "foreign affairs
exception" to "the broader rule against executive lawmaking" that was grounded neither in
"constitutional text" nor "longstanding practice"); Van Alstine, supra note 76, at 346-47 (explaining
that broad readings of the extent of presidential power in foreign affairs under Garamendi fail to
understand the importance to the Court of Congress' acquiescence to the kinds of activities in
which the president was engaging in that case).
78. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
79. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
80. Medellfn, 128 S. Ct. at 1367 ("The United States maintains that the President's
constitutional role 'uniquely qualifies' him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear
on compliance with an [International Court of Justice] decision and 'to do so expeditiously.'... In
this case, the President seeks to vindicate United States interests in ensuring the reciprocal
observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and
demonstrating commitment to the role of international law. These interests are plainly compelling.
Such considerations, however, do not allow us to set aside first principles.... Justice Jackson's
familiar tripartite scheme [from Youngstown] provides the accepted framework for evaluating
executive action in this area.") (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, 12, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984)).
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either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely
upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain.".... In this circumstance, Presidential
authority can derive support from "congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence." . . Finally, "when the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power
is at its lowest ebb," and the Court can sustain his actions "only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject."'"
Needless to say, debates often occur over the category into which a particular
presidential action fits, as statutes may either more-or substantially
less-explicitly authorize certain kinds of foreign affairs decisions by
the president.82 Nevertheless, Youngstown does, in general, "stand[ ] for the
proposition that Congress has broad authority to structure the exercise of
executive authority," including in the realm of foreign affairs. 3
The Youngstown framework helps to make sense of when the Supreme
Court has accepted the bargaining chip objection to state foreign affairs
activities. For instance, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council84 the
Court recognized the "competence" of informal executive branch statements
to establish that a Massachusetts statute restricting state purchases from firms
doing business in Burma undercut the president's power to negotiate with
Burma under a federal economic sanctions program.85 The Court did so,
however, because the president was operating pursuant to an express
delegation of authority from Congress to pursue multilateral diplomatic
pressure against Burma, thereby affording him the greatest scope of his power
under Justice Jackson's Youngstown framework. Earlier, in Dames & Moore
v. Regan,86 the Court acknowledged that the president's control of foreign
assets and suspension of domestic litigation in response to the Iranian hostage
crisis was an essential carrot with which he could attempt a successful resolu-
tion of the situation. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, while
observing that the boundaries between the Youngstown categories are more
81. Id. at 1368 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635, 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
82. Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (deeming
the executive branch's detention of Hamdi not sanctioned by Congress' Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF) and therefore involving the "lowest ebb" of the president's power under
Justice Jackson's framework from Youngstown), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 517 (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion) (determining that the AUMF did allow for Hamdi's detention).
83. Ernest Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 442 (2007).
84. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
85. Id. at 377.
86. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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fluid than often described,87 nevertheless focused throughout on whether the
president's actions had been expressly or impliedly approved of by Congress.
Rather than simply invoking an independent presidential authority to resolve
international disputes without congressional delegation or oversight, the
Court referred with approval to Justice Frankfurter's statement from Youngstown
that, "'a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned... may be treated
as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II."' s
Thus, in both Crosby and Dames & Moore, the effective exercise of the
president's foreign affairs authority was seen to depend on a clearing of
space, such that foreign entities would be obliged only to negotiate with
the federal executive branch in order to achieve a coherent and comprehen-
sive resolution of the relevant matter.89 Also in both cases, however,
the president's ability to constitutionally assert the need for such a clearing
of space depended on Congress at least tacitly endorsing his activities.
Even Garamendi itself can be understood through the Youngstown
framework. To be sure, the Court found that the California insurance
disclosure law conflicted with U.S. foreign policy based only on letters and
congressional testimony by executive branch officials, much like the
relatively informal statements that have been relied on by litigants and
opponents to advance the view that California's climate change activities
should be preempted.9" The weight that the Court in Garamendi placed upon
87. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Dames & Moore, invoked Justice Jackson's
categories from Youngstown, he indicated that they represented more of a malleable standard than a
clear rule: "Although we have in the past found and do today find Justice Jackson's classification of
executive actions into three general categories analytically useful, we should be mindful of Justice
Holmes' admonition .... that '[t]he great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white.' . . .Justice Jackson himself recognized that his three categories represented
'a somewhat over-simplified grouping,' . . . and it is doubtless the case that executive action in any
particular instance falls, not neatly into one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along
a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.
This is particularly true as respects cases such as the one before us, involving responses to
international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in any
detail." Id. at 669.
88. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11.
89. As the Crosby Court put it, "We need not get into any general consideration of limits of
state action affecting foreign affairs to realize that the President's maximum power to persuade rests
on his capacity to bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception
for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political tactics." Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382; see also
id. at 377 ("Quite simply, if the Massachusetts law is enforceable the President has less to offer and
less economic and diplomatic leverage as a consequence.... [T]he state Act reduces the value of the
chips created by the federal statute. It thus 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."').
90. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 422 (2003) (citing the views articulated
at "high levels of the Executive Branch").
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these informal comments resulted, however, from the precise area of activity
involved in the case: post-conflict international claims resolution. As Justice
Souter asserted in his opinion for the majority in Garamendi:
Making executive agreements to settle claims of American nation-
als against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding
practice.... Given the fact that the practice goes back over 200 years
and has received congressional acquiescence throughout its history,
the conclusion "[t]hat the President's control of foreign relations
includes the settlement of claims is indisputable."91
Youngstown, thus, could be seen lurking in the background of even
Garamendi: Because Congress had responded to prior presidential efforts
to settle Americans' claims against foreign governments with "inertia,
indifference or quiescence," the Court was entitled to assume that the presi-
dent's actions represented a legitimate exercise of power within the "zone
of twilight."92 The less Congress has expressed its approval, the less informal
executive branch statements will affect the Court's determination.
In Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board of California,93 by contrast, the
Court refused to strike down a California tax provision under the Foreign
Commerce Clause because it found that Congress had assented implicitly
to California's policy of requiring "worldwide combined reporting" of
corporate income.94 Importantly, executive branch officials had stressed in
press releases, letters, and amicus briefs that the California policy would
invite harmful economic retaliation by foreign nations. The Court deemed
those informal executive expressions "merely precatory"; as such, they were
insufficient to raise even the prospect that they might constitute a manifesta-
tion of the president's "independent powers," as required, according to Justice
Jackson, whenever the president purports to act legitimately at the "lowest
ebb" of his authority under category three.9 These executive branch
statements were, therefore, clearly inadequate to invalidate California's tax
rule.96 Notably, in Barclays Bank, the Court deduced Congress' approval of
California's scheme from its failure to act on legislative proposals to prohibit
state imposition of worldwide combined reporting. 97 As justice Ginsburg
91. Id. at 415 (quoting U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 240 (1942)).
92. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
93. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
94. Id. at 326.
95. Id. at 329-30 ("Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the
force of law cannot render unconstitutional California's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned,
use of worldwide combined reporting." (emphasis added)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 324-28.
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wrote, "That the Executive Branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state
taxation practice, but encountered an unreceptive Congress, is not evidence
that the practice interfered with the Nation's ability to speak with one voice,
but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker decided to yield the
floor to others."98
To date, several observers-including two federal district court judges
weighing challenges to state regulation of GHG emissions from motor
vehicles prior to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) decision to
deny California's Clean Air Act waiver request-have concluded that the
federal government simply has not spoken clearly enough in the climate
change context to establish a foreign affairs position with which California
could be said to be in conflict.99 They note, for instance, that in some
settings the executive branch has actually held up state and local climate
policies as a shining example of all that the United States is doing to address
climate change."e As we have stressed throughout this Part, however,
the outcome of the bargaining chip objection does not solely hinge on
whether the federal government has expressed a foreign policy position
against unilateral domestic GHG abatement with adequate clarity and
formality to constitute a "policy," as opposed to merely a "strategy."' 0 '
Instead, the outcome hinges on whether the Court will give weight to
relatively informal executive branch assertions of the bargaining chip theory
as a federal position-a question that, in turn, hinges on whether the assertions
pertain to an area of traditional congressionally condoned presidential foreign
affairs authority, as in Garamendi, or an area in which the president is acting
with express congressional delegation and approval, as in Crosby.
98. Id. at 328-29; see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 385-86
(2000) (distinguishing Barclays Bank on the ground that the majority in the latter case had "found
the reactions of foreign powers and the opinions of the Executive irrelevant in fathoming
congressional intent because Congress had taken specific actions rejecting the positions both of
foreign governments . . . and the Executive").
99. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007);
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 2007 WL 4372878 (E.D. Cal.); see also Note, Foreign
Affairs Preemption, supra note 11, at 1889 ("The record of congressional and executive actions does
not clearly establish that the federal government is committed to pursuing a binding multilateral
agreement on climate change.").
100. See Re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards Into Procurement Policies,
Rulemaking Proceeding 06-04-009, Decision 07-01-039 (California Public Utilities Commission
2007), 2007 WL 403573, at *91-92 [hereinafter CPUC Proceeding].
101. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1186-87 ("The term 'policy' as used in Zschernig
and its progeny refers to a concrete set of goals, objectives, and/or means to be undertaken to achieve
a predetermined result.... In order to conflict or interfere with foreign policy within the
meaning of Zschernig, Garamendi or related cases, the interference must be with a policy, not simply
with the means of negotiating a policy.").
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Notwithstanding a long history of executive branch leadership in interna-
tional environmental lawmaking,"' the president cannot be comfortably
presumed to have broad authority to act with the acquiescence of Congress
with regard to the climate change conundrum. Unlike postconflict claims
resolution, which involves relatively discrete, one-time settlement of
international disputes, addressing climate change will necessarily require
vast, complex interventions into the flow and content of not only domestic,
but also foreign commerce, an area in which, as Justice Souter recalled in
Garamendi, "Congress holds express authority to regulate."' 3 Indeed, because
it implicates foundational elements of the regulated economy, climate change
policy must entail a delicate interplay between foreign negotiation and
domestic legislation, one that requires heavy involvement of both the federal
executive and legislative branches. The Supreme Court itself, in Massachusetts
v. EPA,' implicitly affirmed the necessity for coordination between
Congress and the president with respect to climate change initiatives. Faced
with the Bush Administration's opposition to EPA regulation of GHG
emissions, based in part on the theory that climate change regulation should
only go forward in the context of agreements with India, China, and other
"key developing nations," Justice Stevens instead insisted on the EPA's
obligation "to comply with [the] clear statutory command" of the Clean Air
Act. °5 The Court therefore concluded, in fairly definitive language, that,
"while the President has broad authority in foreign affairs, that authority does
not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws.',
0 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Court made two .critical analytical
moves. First, it stressed that Congress had delegated foreign policy authority
in the climate change context to the secretary'of state, rather than to the
EPA.0 7 Thus, the Court dismissed out of hand the EPA's assertions that
regulating motor vehicle emissions might undercut the president's ability to
102. Cf. David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and American
Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377, 420 (1992) ("Through its own inattention, by Executive
Branch design, or both, the Congress has been marginalized in the negotiation and implementation
of many international environmental agreements.").
103. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003).
104. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
105. See id. at 1462-63.
106. Id. at 1463.
107. See id. at 1448. Specifically, in the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Congress
directed the president to develop a national policy on climate change, but called upon the secretary
of state "to coordinate those aspects of United States policy requiring action through the
channels of multilateral diplomacy." Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 1103(b)-(c), 101 Stat. 1407, 1408-09
(1987) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2904(b)-(c)(2000)).
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persuade other nations to join a multilateral reduction scheme." 8 Second,
the Court interpreted Congress' definition of air pollutant in section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act to be capacious enough to encompass GHG
emissions, assuming that the EPA makes the initial determination that they
contribute to climate change in a way that endangers public health or
welfare."° Through these two steps, the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA
construed the agency's assertion of the "bargaining chip theory" as one
involving the "lowest ebb" of presidential power, where Congress has spoken
and the President resists its instructions."' Whether or not one agrees with
Justice Stevens' claim in Massachusetts v. EPA to have been merely
construing the intent expressed by Congress when it adopted and amended
the Clean Air Act in the 1970s, the executive no longer can contend that it
is operating with the tacit support of the legislature in its opposition to
unilateral domestic emissions reductions, as it perhaps could have during the
period in which the Byrd-Hagel Resolution represented the Senate's clearest
statement of its views regarding the propriety of advance domestic GHG
emissions abatement.11' The federal government's "one voice" instead has
become fractured, necessitating judicial determination of what, in fact,
the authoritative national position on climate change actually is before
resolving whether a state's action should be viewed as inconsistent with that
position. Because the president is, in this case, acting at the "lowest ebb,"
' 2
informal statements emanating from the executive branch regarding the need
for preemption will, as Barclays Bank illuminates, be accorded less weight.
108. In Garamendi, by contrast, the Court failed to engage in a detailed inquiry regarding
which departments and which officials were seen to be representing executive branch foreign policy
because, again, the Court perceived no potential conflict between Congress and the president. See
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 423 n.13 ("The dissent would also dismiss the other Executive Branch
expressions of the Government's policy... insisting on nothing short of a formal statement by the
President himself.... But there is no suggestion that these high-level executive officials were not
faithfully representing the president's chosen policy, and there is no apparent reason for adopting the
dissent's 'nondelegation' rule to apply within the Executive Branch.").
109. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1462 ("While the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1)
might not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they
did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific
developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete.").
110. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of the history of presidential action at this "lowest ebb," see
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb--A Constitutional
History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008).
111. See supra note 28 (describing recent signs of support within Congress for domestic GHG
emissions reductions perhaps even in advance of multilateral commitment).
112. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
1648
HeinOnline -- 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1648 2007-2008
Even on the broad reading of Garamendi and related precedents
advanced by the Bush Administration, in which the extent of presidential
power in foreign affairs is not so strongly tied to the need for express or tacit
congressional approval under the Youngstown framework,. additional factors
militate against the conclusion that state climate change initiatives such as
those pursued by California could be preempted. Most notably, the Court
purports to adopt a more circumspect attitude toward foreign affairs
preemption when the state foreign affairs activity said to be in conflict repre-
sents an area of traditional state regulation. As Justice Souter suggested in
Garamendi: "Where... a State has acted within what Justice Harlan called
its 'traditional competence,' but in a way that affects foreign relations, it
might make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality
that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of the state
concern asserted.".. At first glance, then, one might predict that the Court
would hesitate to find foreign affairs preemption in the context of climate
change regulation, since environmental protection is often stated to lie
within the states' traditional purview. For instance, in the domestic
Commerce Clause case of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,"4 involving
Maryland's efforts to enhance its environment by encouraging the rapid
processing of abandoned vehicles, the Court emphasized that Maryland's
interest in protecting its environment represented a legitimate, and even
laudable, purpose."' Because meaningful climate change policy will have
dramatic consequences for environmental, economic, energy, land use, and
other primary government regulatory functions, it implicates a host of such
areas of "traditional state authority."
'
"
6
On the other hand, Garamendi involved insurance regulation, surely
itself an area of traditional state authority. This fact did not trouble the
Garamendi majority, however, because it was willing to look beyond
the surface of the California regulation to discern a nontraditional purpose.
Rather than attempting to effectuate "legitimate consumer protection
113. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968));
see also id. at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The displacement of state law by preemption properly
requires a considerably more formal and binding federal instrument.").
114. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
115. Id. at 809 ("Maryland entered the market for the purpose, agreed by all to be
commendable as well as legitimate, of protecting the State's environment."); id. at 814 ("The 1974
amendment bears a rational relationship to Maryland's purpose of using its limited funds to clean up
its own environment.").
116. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (speaking of the "[riegulation of land use" as "a quintessential state and local power" and an
"area of traditional state authority").
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interests in knowing which insurers have failed to pay insurance claims,"
Justice Souter emphasized that the California regulation "effectively singles
out only policies issued by European companies, in Europe, to European
residents, at least 55 years ago," a fact that "raises great doubt that the
purpose of the California law is an evaluation of corporate reliability in
contemporary insuring in the State."'17 Thus, the Court viewed California's
fundamental purpose to be one and the same as the national govern-
ment's, namely, "seek[ing] to vindicate the claims of Holocaust survivors. '
From that vantage point, California's interest in advocating for its "roughly
5,600 documented Holocaust survivors" paled in comparison to the federal
government's interest in representing approximately "100,000 survivors"
nationwide. 9 Thus, "[als against the responsibility of the United States of
America, the humanity underlying the state statute could not give the State
the benefit of any doubt in resolving the conflict with national policy."'20
One could imagine a similar line of argument being applied against
California in the climate change context. Although commentators have
tended to regard the two situations as distinguishable, 2' in both cases
the manner in which California exercised its admittedly traditional
state authority is only explicable in relation to nontraditional foreign
affairs concerns. Mandated disclosure of Holocaust-era financial information
would seem arbitrary outside of an international context of continuing
ethical and political demands for justice from the individuals and entities
associated with Nazi Germany. Likewise, mandatory limits on GHG
emissions make little sense in the absence of a simultaneous commitment by
California to aggressively encourage comparable actions by a sufficient
number of other states and nations to render its program not just symbolically,
but instrumentally efficacious. In both cases, the exercise of an area of
traditional state authority may be readily recharacterized as an intervention
into foreign affairs. Again, whether or not the Court will engage in such a
recharacterization seems to depend on considerations of how to balance
authority, not only between the states and the national government, but also
between the president and Congress.
117. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 425-26.
118. Id. at 426.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 426-27.
121. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 10663 ("As compared to the limited aim of
redressing Holocaust victims in Garamendi, a GHG emissions trading scheme would have much
broader relevance for the entire state.").
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In Garamendi, for instance, California argued that Congress had broadly
condoned state insurance regulation through passage of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, which states that "continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest" and that
"silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.'
22
Justice Souter rejected this argument on the theory that "a federal statute
directed to implied preemption by domestic commerce legislation cannot
sensibly be construed to address preemption by executive conduct in foreign
affairs."'' This quick dismissal suggests that, in the Court's view, the
president holds strong authority in the area of postconflict claims resolution,
even as against actions by the states that might be alternatively characterized
as simple insurance regulations, and even as against actions from Congress
that might alternatively have been seen to utilize its foreign-rather than
domestic-commerce authority in support of state regulations.'24  Thus,
whether California's climate change activities would be deemed to fall within
the state's traditional purview in the face of a preemption claim by the
president depends not simply on a formalistic assessment of the subject matter
of the regulation, but on whether the Court regards the climate change
problem to be one of primarily congressional or presidential authority.
Again, in this respect, Massachusetts v. EPA bodes well for California, since
the Court in that case rejected out of hand the EPA's assertion that foreign
policy concerns trumped its obligation to implement Congress' Clean Air
Act directives.
1II. SITTING IN JUDGMENT: GHG EMISSIONS TRADING
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S "ONE VOICE"
As noted in Part I, challenging implementation issues will arise when
California attempts to ensure the integrity of any eventual GHG emissions
trading scheme that it develops. Unless other jurisdictions adopt comparably
stringent reduction schemes, firms within California will be left at a
competitive disadvantage with firms outside of the state. This disadvantage,
along with the related problem of leakage-which entails firms and industries
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).
123. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428.
124. Later, Justice Souter's opinion for the Court stated that "it is worth noting that Congress
has done nothing to express disapproval of the President's policy." Id. at 429. Again, the impression
that Congress had "done nothing" arguably only arose because the Court had construed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to avoid a conflict with the president's asserted foreign affairs position.
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relocating entirely outside of California's jurisdiction in order to avoid
restrictions-not only impairs the state's economic interests; it also threatens
the environmental success of the GHG emissions control regime, since the
emissions that California would have averted through regulation are instead
produced by other sources. Thus, as does any jurisdiction seeking to
unilaterally control GHG emissions, California has strong policy reasons
to protect the integrity of its regime through compensating import taxes,
permit purchase requirements, and other border adjustments applied to out-
of-state entities. 
25
Of course, California ultimately would prefer not to depend on border
adjustments, but instead to see its pioneering cap-and-trade program followed
by other states and nations, such that eventually GHG emissions would be
controlled on a global basis through an integrated permit market. Policy
experts agree that linkage of multiple GHG emissions cap-and-trade
programs is desirable in order to reduce compliance costs and promote
flexibility.26 Moreover, the greater the number and scope of effective,
operating GHG emissions trading systems, the more likely the prospect that
any one system will be able to take credit for having helped avert the climate
crisis. Nevertheless, linking raises practical and political challenges that
ultimately may draw states into unconstitutional territory. As the Market
Advisory Committee observed, deciding whether to link with another GHG
emissions trading system requires CARB to undertake a variety of intrusive
inspections regarding, inter alia, "the scope and stringency of the other
system; the integrity of the cap in the other system, including whether
that system contains a 'safety-valve' mechanism that suspends or otherwise
undermines the cap; the rigor of emissions monitoring, reporting, and
verification requirements in the other system; the integrity of allowed carbon
offsets; and the record of compliance and enforcement in the other system."'27
Despite serving a critical role in ensuring the overall policy effectiveness of
GHG emissions regulation, this need to evaluate the stringency and
effectiveness of other jurisdictions' trading systems prior to integration
raises a variety of constitutional concerns.
125. See Chemerinsky et al., sup'ra note 11, at 10654-59
126. See MARKET ADVISORY COMM., supra note 38, at 69.
127. Id. at 72; see also W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, STATEMENT OF REGIONAL GOAL (2007),
available at http://westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O104F13006.pdf (listing
considerations with respect to proposed new members for "determining whether the new entrant is
undertaking comparable efforts to meet the challenge of climate change" to the efforts of
existing members).
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Linkage with foreign GHG emissions trading systems would prove
especially challenging. Although in recent years the Supreme Court has
tended to favor express and conflict preemption theories of federal foreign
affairs exclusivity, 2 ' the so-called dormant foreign affairs preemption theory
of Zschernig v. Miller'29 remains a potential obstacle to state climate change
policy integration with foreign nations. In Zschernig, the Court preempted an
Oregon probate law that prohibited inheritance by foreign nationals unless
the heir's home jurisdiction would protect the property from confiscation and
afford reciprocal rights of inheritance to American citizens. Essentially an
anticommunism statute, the Oregon probate law was challenged by would-be
heirs as an interference with federal foreign affairs. 30 Despite the facts that
probate is an area of traditional state regulation, that no federal law, treaty,
or executive agreement preempted the state statute, and that the Department
of Justice submitted an amicus brief conceding that "the government
[did not] contend that the application of the Oregon escheat
statute ... unduly interferes with the United States' conduct of foreign
relations,"'' the Court nevertheless ruled that the statute was "an
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.'. 2 In particular,
the Court believed that the statute impermissibly invited Oregon
courts to sit in judgment upon foreign governments and to exert coer-
cive influence over those governments' internal affairs through selective
128. Leanne Wilson, Note, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi
and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 747 (2007).
129. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Some commentators also regard Garamendi as a dormant foreign
affairs preemption case, in the sense that Justice Souter's majority opinion is amenable to
an expansive field preemption interpretation that would render it functionally quite similar
to dormant foreign affairs preemption. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 10662;
Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Note, Gara-mending the Doctrine of Foreign Affairs Preemption, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 203, 213 (2004) (observing that the Garamendi Court may have been invoking foreign affairs
preemption, despite the claim of conflict preemption); Todd Steigman, Note, Lowering the Bar:
Invalidation of State Laws Affecting Foreign Affairs Under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power After
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 465 (2004). Others view
Garamendi as a more conventional conflict preemption case. See, e.g., Note, Foreign Affairs
Preemption, supra note 11. In truth, Justice Souter in Garamendi dodged the question of whether the
California Holocaust Victim's Insurance Relief Act of 1999 only foundered because of a direct
conflict with the executive agreements establishing Holocaust claims mechanisms, as opposed to
being more broadly vulnerable as an overreaching of state authority. See Garamendi, 539
U.S. at 419-20 ("It is a fair question whether respect for the executive foreign relations power
requires a categorical choice between the contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption
evident in the Zschernig opinions .... [T]he question requires no answer here." (footnote omitted)).
130. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
131. Wilson, supra note 128, at 759 n.88 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, at
6 n.5, Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429 (No. 21)).
132. Zschemig, 389 U.S. at 432.
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denial of economic benefits-a practice that would "unduly interfere" with
the federal government's "one voice" in foreign affairs, and that had "great
potential for disruption or embarrassment" to the nation."
The concerns motivating Zschernig also find expression in the Court's
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 4 In Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles,'" for instance, the Court indicated that the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause reflects concerns that state regulation of economic
intercourse with foreign nations might invite retaliatory measures from those
nations or, more broadly, might "prevent[ ] the Federal Government from
'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments. '" 36 In general, the Court has continued to reaffirm the notion
that its dormant Commerce Clause inquiry in the foreign arena contains all
of the elements of the domestic inquiry, in addition to the "one voice"
'37
concern. As a result, it has maintained that the Foreign Commerce
133. Id. at 434, 435.
134. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1999)
(noting the joint role of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and the dormant foreign affairs
power in protecting federal foreign affairs exclusivity).
135. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
136. Id. at 451. Although the Court sometimes cites the same precedents for the importance
of maintaining "one voice" in the foreign affairs and Foreign Commerce Clause arenas, which voice
is designated seems quite different in the two contexts. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396, 414 (2003) (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434, a foreign commerce clause case). With respect to
foreign affairs, the operative voice is that of the president; hence, in Garamendi, Justice Souter wrote
that "[t]he law thus 'compromise[s] the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with
one voice in dealing with other governments' to resolve claims against European companies arising out of
World War II." Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 424 (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 381 (2000)). With respect to foreign commerce, by contrast, the specified voice is that of the
federal government as a whole; thus, in Barclays Bank, Justice Ginsburg discussed "the Federal
Government's capacity to 'speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments."' Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 311 (1994) (citing Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 449).
137. The Court has been clearest about the steps of this inquiry in the tax context. According
to Justice Brennan's opinion in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986):
When a state tax is challenged as violative of the dormant Interstate Commerce
Clause, we have asked four questions: is the tax applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing State; is the tax fairly apportioned; does the tax discriminate against
interstate commerce; and is the tax fairly related to the services provided by the
State.... In Japan line... we noted that when the state tax allegedly interferes with
the Federal Government's authority to regulate foreign commerce, two additional questions
must be asked; "first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial
risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal
Government from speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with
foreign governments."
Id. at 8 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451). Although we focus in the text on the "one voice"
concern, it is worth noting that the risk of multiple taxation also arises in the context of GHG
emissions trading systems. Unless a jurisdiction recognizes the GHG emissions permits surrendered
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Clause represents even more of a straightjacket for states than its domestic
counterpart. 38 Nevertheless, the Court has not generally mirrored the
domestic dormant Commerce Clause analysis in its dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause cases. 139  Instead, as with the Zschernig doctrine,
states' practice of sitting in judgment upon the internal affairs of foreign
jurisdictions-and even attempting to influence those affairs through
financial incentives-has been seen by the Court as the chief concern of
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis. Thus, in order to protect the
federal government's ability to present a unified position and personality on
the global stage, the Court has held that state action must be invalidated "if it
either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal
Government or violates a clear federal directive."'" Furthermore, the Court's
application of the "one voice" inquiry in the foreign Commerce Clause
context has born greater resemblance to a conflict or implied preemption
than a dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Rather than invalidating all
state laws that might lead to a disunified voice in foreign commerce,
regardless of whether Congress has spoken or not, the Court has assessed
whether or not Congress actually intends to retain its singular voice or
by an actor in compliance with its home jurisdiction's cap, the possibility arises that the actor will be
required to pay twice for the same ton of CO, equivalent emissions.
138. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 311 ("In 'the unique context of foreign commerce,' a
State's power is further constrained because of 'the special need for federal uniformity."') (quoting
Wardair Can., 477 U.S. at 8); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-21 (2d ed. 1988) ("If state action touching foreign commerce is to
be allowed, it must be shown not to affect national concerns to any significant degree, a far more
difficult task than in the case of interstate commerce."). Several courts of appeal have likewise
insisted on the greater rigor of the dormant foreign commerce analysis than the usual dormant
commerce inquiry. See, e.g., Piazza's Seafood.World v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 2006)
("[T]he scope of Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce, and accordingly the limit on the
power of the states in that area, is greater."); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 66
(1st Cit. 1999) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that state regulations that
touch on foreign commerce receive a greater degree of scrutiny than do regulations that affect
only domestic commerce.").
139. It came closest to doing so when it invalidated an Iowa tax as facially discriminatory
against foreign commerce in Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, 505
U.S. 71 (1992). In that case, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, cited domestic dormant
commerce precedents to support his assertion that, "[aibsent a compelling justification .... a State
may not advance its legitimate goals by means that facially discriminate against foreign commerce."
Id. at 81. At least one commentator has argued that the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause does
not serve the same interests as the domestic dormant Commerce Clause and that it should be
superseded by a preemption analysis. See generally Wilson, supra note 128.
140. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983). Accordingly,
state protectionism is not necessarily the touchstone of the analysis as it is with the domestic
dormant Commerce Clause: "[A] State's preference for domestic commerce over foreign commerce is
inconsistent with the Commerce Clause even if the State's own economy is not a direct beneficiary
of the discrimination." Kraft, 505 U.S. at 79.
HeinOnline -- 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1655 2007-2008
instead has suggested through various informal means that it intends to
permit experimentation among the states. As Justice Ginsburg explained
in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board,' "[am important premise
underlying [prior dormant Foreign Commerce Clause] decisions is this: Congress
may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not 'impair federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential'. .. it need not
convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state
regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce." '142 Congressional
failure to act in a particular area may itself constitute such a passive indication.'
Commentators thus far have tended to argue that state climate change
initiatives will not face difficulties under Zschemig or the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause.'44 Here, though, we think the existing commentary
overlooks some mechanical implications of GHG emissions trading schemes
that might make them closer than appreciated to state activities previously
held unconstitutional. As noted above, the ability of GHG emissions trading
systems to be linked with those of other jurisdictions in a way that does not
undermine regulatory effectiveness depends on the systems' having established
mutually agreeable abatement goals, such that emissions permits in theory
correspond to GHG reduction goals that the jurisdictions agree are
comparable. It also depends on those jurisdictions undertaking comparably
effective emissions monitoring, such that permits in actuality have the
regulatory value that they claim to represent. The first of these tasks might
be thought to be relatively simple, since all jurisdictions might agree to the
same percentage reduction below the same historical benchmark, for
instance. But, it need not be so straightforward. It could instead involve
judgments about global equity, development status, historical contributions
to the climate change problem, and other moral and political considerations.'45
Even if jurisdictions agree that their overall emissions cap and schedule
of reductions are comparable, there still must be scrutiny of the manner in
which reductions are pursued. As the Market Advisory Committee report
141. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
142. Id. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448).
143. See id. at 324-26.
144. See Hannah Chang, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Legality of California's Link With the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10771, 10782 (2007) ("California's
legislation neither restricts, sanctions, criticizes, nor taxes a foreign country or its nationals
or instrumentalities."); Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 11, at 1898 ("[W]ithout a
controlling federal law or a clear conflict with executive foreign policy of the kind found
in Garamendi, and in the absence of any direct interaction with foreign governments, foreign
nationals, or their business partners, courts should presume that state GHG regulations are not
a 'matter of foreign policy.'").
145. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1621 (2008)1656
HeinOnline -- 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1656 2007-2008
Like a Nation State
made clear, GHG emissions trading markets do not simply appear with the
ease of environmental economics textbook hypotheticals' 46 An enormous
amount of scientific, economic, and political judgment must go into determin-
ing which sectors and firms to target with caps, how to allocate permits
among them, whether to auction or give away permits, how to handle safety
valves and offsets, and so on. Many of these judgments will be matters about
which jurisdictions may vehemently disagree. To take just one salient
example, a great deal of critical scientific attention has focused recently
on the role of biofuels such as ethanol in the effort to combat GHG
emissions. Britain's Royal Society, for instance, has warned that biofuels must
be assessed, not only for their direct GHG emissions, but also for their
environmental impacts due to fertilizer and processing emissions, land use
changes, water consumption, biodiversity effects, and water and air pollution,
as well as their economic and social impacts on global agricultural markets.'47
With respect to land use effects, a study in Science estimated that conversion
of carbon-rich habitats into cropland for biofuel production could create a
"carbon debt" in which decades or even centuries are required before the net
GHG effect of biofuel production relative to fossil fuel use would actually
be desirable. 4 In light of such evidence-and given the monumental interest
group maneuvering that surrounds agriculture and its subsidization4-it is
not implausible to imagine jurisdictions encountering intractable political
divides when it comes to the regulatory treatment of ethanol or other
controversial biofuels within GHG emissions trading schemes. To evaluate
such matters for regulatory compatibility seems undeniably to risk one jurisdic-
tion sitting in judgment upon another.
The second linkage challenge-ensuring adequate monitoring and
enforcement of GHG emissions trading programs for integration purposes-also
requires sitting in judgment upon a foreign jurisdiction and its internal affairs.
The question of monitoring essentially comes down to a question regarding
the effectiveness of the other jurisdiction's governmental institutions and
procedures. Put bluntly, does the rule of law operate with adequate force in
the partner jurisdiction for the linking state to be confident that its GHG
permits will not be transformed into hot air by allowing them to be traded
146. MARKET ADVISORY COMM., supra note 38, at 15-17 (observing lessons learned from
prior successful and unsuccessful cap-and-trade schemes).
147. ROYAL SOC'Y, SUSTAINABLE BIOFUELS: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES (2008), available
at http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=28914.
148. Joseph Fargione et al., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319 SCIENCE 1235,
1236-37 (2008).
149. Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 263 (2000).
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with the other jurisdiction's permits? In some circles, this line of inquiry into
the effectiveness of the rule of law in foreign nations has become something
of a contemporary counterpart to Cold War-era scrutiny of nations' economic
structures. 50 Accordingly, recent commentators have urged California
to "proceed gingerly when attempting to bridge markets," noting that "[t]he
more that California attempts to engage in negotiations about economic or
political discrepancies between trading systems, the more likely that it will
enter the realm of foreign policy.' 5. Although legally sound, this advice may
underestimate as a policy matter how difficult it would be for California to
successfully link its GHG emissions program with those of other jurisdictions,
unless it engaged in precisely the kinds of negotiation and judgments being
advised against. In Zschernig, the Court especially worried about the Oregon
statute's demand that state courts "launch[] inquiries into the type of
governments that obtain in particular foreign nations," and engage in
''minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign law
[and] into the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements." '52 Such inquiries
are not that dissimilar to those that must be undertaken by state regulators in
order to successfully effect an integration of GHG emissions schemes.
Thus, although heavily criticized'53 and perhaps only reaffirmed sub rosa
,151
by American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, the case of Zschernig, along with
similar restrictions that emanate from the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause, presents a serious question as to the constitutionality of state-level
integration of GHG emissions schemes with those of other jurisdictions.
IV. "SINK OR SWIM TOGETHER": GHG EMISSIONS TRADING
AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
In light of more conventional dormant Commerce Clause principles,
there is additional reason to question whether California could constitutionally
refuse to integrate its GHG emissions market or otherwise defend the
integrity of its market through regulations. Specifically, California may
encounter difficulty in defining the purpose of a selective linkage program or
a border adjustment regulation in a manner that acceptably invokes local
150. See generally Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and
Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?, 41 L. & SOc'Y REV. 865 (2007).
151. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 10664.
152. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,434, 435 (1968).
153. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water's Edge: State Procurement
Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001) (referring to Zschernig as "a weak,
poorly reasoned, and aberrational precedent").
154. 539 U.S. 396 (2003); see supra text accompanying note 129.
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interests and avoids appearing unduly burdensome on commerce. Because
the Court has invoked the same standard it employs in the domestic arena in
considering state legislation that facially discriminates against foreign
commerce-a standard of virtually per se invalidity' 5-it may be extremely
difficult for California to justify treating GHG emissions trading schemes,
whether foreign or domestic, differently from its own. Much will depend on
how the regulation is conceptualized. Formally, a trading permit scheme can
be shown to be equivalent to a tax regime; 56 thus, one might argue that it
should be evaluated according to the cases and standards applicable to
arguably discriminatory state tax and regulatory laws. On the other hand, the
regulatory instrument created by a permit scheme is, in a sense, propertized;
indeed, its efficiency-enhancing potential derives from the very fact that it
may be traded by private actors, much like an article of commerce. From this
perspective, then, the relevant article of commerce that is arguably burdened
by state regulation is the emissions permit itself, rather than the underlying
goods and services (such as electricity, vehicle fuel, or agricultural goods) that
are produced under the GHG emissions cap or that, if produced out of state, are
made to conform to in-state regulations through some border adjustment.
Characterizing GHG emissions permits as an article of commerce
subject to conventional nondiscrimination principles has surface plausibility.
The Court has, after all, shown great reluctance to exempt items from
characterization as commerce simply because of their centrality within
natural resources or environmental law.'57 Thus, states may not generally
hoard valuable natural resources for their own citizens' use and enjoyment,
nor may they cordon themselves off from harmful items, such as hazardous
155. See Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 81 (1992)
("Absent a compelling justification.., a state may not advance its legitimate goals by means that
facially discriminate against foreign commerce."); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-28
(1998). But cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a Maine ban on the importation of
baitfish as the only available means to protect indigenous species from the threat of disease).
156. See generally Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974)
(demonstrating that, as an initial matter, tradable permits sold at auction have the same effect as a
tax under conditions of perfect information).
157. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 952 (1982) (concluding
that groundwater is an article of commerce, despite the fact that "water, unlike other natural
resources, is essential for human survival"); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.
383, 390-91 (1994) ("[Wlhat makes garbage a profitable business is not its own worth but the fact
that its possessor must pay to get rid of it. In other words, the article of commerce is not so much the
solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing and disposing of it."); New England Power Co.
v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982) ("Our cases consistently have held that the Commerce
Clause ... precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of
access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the
products derived therefrom.").
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waste, that are subjects of commercialized handling and disposal practices. In
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 8 for instance, the Court held that a New
Jersey ban on out-of-state waste violated the dormant Commerce Clause
despite the state's acknowledged interest in managing scarce landfill space.
The Court drew no distinction between articles of commerce that were
valuable in themselves and those that became valuable because of a need to
address their ill effects, stating simply that "[wihat is crucial is the attempt
by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting
a barrier against the movement of interstate trade."'' 9 Especially as the
market for GHG emissions reduction credits grows in scope and sophistica-
tion, the impulse to extend the City of Philadelphia reasoning will be strong: Just
as states may not isolate themselves from the common problem of waste
disposal, they may not turn their backs on efforts to erect an effective,
fluid market for GHG emissions permits.
By all indications, California has no such desire to isolate itself; to the
contrary, it affirmatively hopes to link its eventual GHG emissions trading
system with those of other states, regions, and nations. In this case, however,
California would face additional constitutional complications. First, it is well
established that "a State may not adopt legislation that has the practical
effect of establishing 'a scale of prices for use in other states.""'  California, espe-
cially if it develops the first successful operating GHG emissions trading
program in the United States, will be in a position to exert tremendous
influence over the shape and ambition of other programs as a condition of
their linkage with California. The state must be careful in the exercise of this
power, since the ability to set the terms of a GHG emissions trading program
is, in no small measure, an ability to affect the tax level, and hence the price,
of electricity, vehicle fuel, and a range of other foundational elements of the
regulated economy. Questions of linkage would become especially delicate.
For instance, although the Court has accepted the legitimacy of some efforts to
equalize the playing field domestically between in-state and out-of-state
commerce, it has taken a dim view of formal attempts to condition favorable
regulatory treatment on reciprocal treatment by other jurisdictions. 6 ' What
states may view as laudatory efforts to promote the development of environmen-
tally preferred technologies and products (without simultaneously exposing
158. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
159. Id. at 628.
160. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935)).
161. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Sporhase,
458 U.S. 941.
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in-state firms to harmful competition from less sustainable alternatives), the
Court may view as impermissible efforts to simply protect domestic interests
or to coerce regulatory outcomes across borders.'62 Similar skepticism would
likely greet any effort by California to condition importation of electricity,
fuel, food, or other GHG-intensive goods and services upon formal adoption
of a comparable GHG emissions trading regime by the exporting jurisdiction.
For this reason, the deftly informal approach that California has taken thus
far to its linkage efforts-as embodied in various memoranda of understand-
ing and other soft law documents63-may go a long way toward dissuading
courts that other jurisdictions are being impermissibly coerced into following
the California climate regimen.
Another promising defense of state regulation of GHG emissions trading
arises from the fact that, apart from certain voluntary private initiatives
established in anticipation of eventual government regulation, GHG emissions
permits are the legal creation of governments. Although tradable in the
manner of commodities, the actual value of GHG emissions permits stems
from their evidentiary force in demonstrating compliance with applicable
regulatory emissions limits. From this perspective, because California will
itself create the GHG emissions trading market, the state could ask that the
Court review its actions with the leniency afforded to states when acting as
market participants.'
This argument would find support in some domestic dormant
Commerce Clause cases, including Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,"5
involving Maryland's creation of a market for automobile hulks, and a case
from this term considering the differential taxation of bonds issued by other
states, Dept. of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis.'66 Hughes, in particular, might
provide a helpful precedent for California, since in that case Maryland was
permitted to impose more burdensome administrative requirements on
haulers of out-of-state junk cars to demonstrate eligibility for a state reclama-
tion bounty. As Justice Stevens emphasized in a concurring opinion, "[bly
162. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 274 (rejecting Ohio's contention that beneficial tax treat-
ment for Ohio-produced ethanol was not facially discriminatory since the statute also granted
favorable treatment to out-of-state producers from states that granted reciprocal advantages, despite
Ohio's argument that "the Ohio provision, far from discriminating against interstate commerce,
is likely to promote it, by encouraging other States to enact similar tax advantages that will
spur the interstate sale of ethanol").
163. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 55, 62.
164. See generally Potts, supra note 11 (arguing that California might successfully avoid
Commerce Clause difficulties in GHG regulation due to the market participant exception).
165. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
166. 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
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artificially enhancing the value of certain abandoned hulks [through the state
bounty program], Maryland created a market that did not previously exist.'
167
Likewise, in establishing a GHG emissions trading scheme, California creates
"commerce which owes its existence to a state ... program."'' 5  Thus,
reasoning from Hughes, the state should be permitted to manage that
program in a manner that ensures its environmental purpose is effectuated.
One potentially decisive problem with this line of analysis for California
in the international context, however, is that the Supreme Court and a
number of circuit courts have indicated that the market participant exception
and its rationale may not apply to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.'69
As the Court itself explained in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,'170 "[we have no
occasion to explore the limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the
'foreign commerce' Clause .... We note, however, that Commerce Clause
scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is
alleged. '17' Thus, the Court's concern to protect the nation's "one voice"
might be overpowering enough to trump even the state's interest as a market
participant. In such a case, unless Congress stepped in affirmatively to permit
discriminatory treatment, California essentially would be required to accept as
equivalent to its own permit any foreign permit purporting to represent a
ton of CO 2 equivalent emissions.
An additional problem with the market participant doctrine arises from
the prospect of regulatory overreaching. Although the market participant
doctrine "allows a state to impose burdens on commerce within the market in
167. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. (emphasizing that "[it is
important to differentiate between commerce which flourishes in a free market and commerce which
owes its existence to a state subsidy program").
168. Id.
169. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,
181 F.3d 38, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[W]e believe that the risks inherent in state regulation of foreign
commerce-including the risk of retaliation against the nation as a whole and the weakening of the
federal government's ability to speak with one voice in foreign affairs... weigh against extending
the market participation exception to the Foreign Commerce Clause."); J.T. Hutchens, The
Market-Participant Exception and the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 445 (2007); Michael A. Zuckerman, Note, The Offshoring of American Government, 94
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (arguing that the market participant exception should not
be extended to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause). But see K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v.
N.J. Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774, 784-87 (N.J. 1977) (upholding a state "Buy
American Act" on market participant grounds, contending that "the cases scrutinizing state
regulations affecting commerce, in the absence of interference with the foreign affairs power, seem
to have made no distinction between interstate and foreign commerce").
170. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
171. Id. at 437 n.9; see also Antilles Cement Corp. v. Acevedo VillI, 408 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cit.
2005) (elaborating on the different conclusions lower courts have reached on the issue of whether
the market participant exception applies in dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases).
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which it is a participant... [tihe State may not impose conditions, whether
by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect
outside of that particular market."'72  Thus, in South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 7' when Alaska tried to use its market role as a
seller of state-owned timber to require all such timber to be partially
processed in state to promote jobs and generate revenue, the Court deemed
its actions a form of impermissible "downstream regulation."'74 The Court's
concern was heightened in the case because "foreign commerce [was]
burdened by the restriction," and "[iut is a well-accepted rule that state
restrictions burdening foreign commerce are subjected to a more rigorous and
searching scrutiny.""'n If the Court took a simplistic view of GHG emissions
permits as commodities, in which rights to emit would be assumed to be
equivalent irrespective of jurisdictional origin unless a state demonstrated
grounds for discriminatory treatment, then the effort to control linkage with
other GHG emissions trading programs would raise constitutional concerns,
notwithstanding the market participant doctrine.
Given that GHG emissions permits are only explicable as part and
parcel of a more elaborate scheme of environmental regulation, the Court
may refrain from characterizing GHG emissions permits as rudimentary
commodities, despite the surface plausibility of this framework. '76 Perhaps
neither a pure property nor a pure regulatory regime provide the best
analogy for conceptualizing a GHG emissions trading scheme, but rather the
more complex arrangement involved in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America.'77 In that case, the Court rejected a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to an Indiana antitakeover statute which prohibited the acquisition
of voting rights by a purchaser of control shares in an Indiana corporation
absent approval by a majority vote of prior disinterested shareholders.' After
172. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984).
173. 467 U.S. 82.
174. Id. at 99.
175. Id. at 100..
176. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997), for
instance, the Court rejected out of hand a claim by the State of Maine to fall within the market
participant exception when it chose to discriminate between providers of charitable services to
in-state and out-of-state beneficiaries for tax exemption purposes: "Maine's tax exemption-which
sweeps to cover broad swathes of the nonprofit sector-must be viewed as action taken in the
State's sovereign capacity rather than a proprietary decision to make an entry into all of the markets
in which the exempted charities function." Id. at 594; see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) ("The market-participant doctrine has no application here. The Ohio
action ultimately at issue is neither its purchase nor its sale of ethanol, but its assessment and
computation of taxes-a primeval governmental activity.").
177. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
178. Id.
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first observing that the statute operated evenhandedly as against both in-state
and out-of-state potential purchasers, the Court then treated the question of
whether the statute had the effect of unduly burdening the interstate market
for corporate acquisitions. '79 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell rejected
this concern because it failed "to appreciate the significance for Commerce
Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is
regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of
state law.'.. He noted that it "is an accepted part of the business landscape
in this country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and
to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares." 8' Moreover,
he emphasized:
[tihe very commodity that is traded in the securities market is
one whose characteristics are defined by state law. Similarly, the
very commodity that is traded in the "market for corporate
control"-the corporation-is one that owes its existence and attrib-
utes to state law. Indiana need not define these commodities as other
States do; it need only provide that residents and nonresidents have
equal access to them.82
Because GHG emissions trading systems ultimately will cover vast swaths of
the economy, including such sectors as electricity, transportation, agriculture,
manufacturing, and commerce, courts may usefully analogize to this corporate
law context, looking beyond the simple propertized form of the GHG
emissions trading system and instead characterizing it as a complex exercise of
the state's regulatory, rather than its proprietary, function.
Further support for this approach comes from the more recent case of
Dept. of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a state taxation scheme that permitted an income tax
deduction for interest paid on bonds issued by the state or its subdivisions, but
not those issued by other states or their subdivisions. Kentucky had pressed
the market participant doctrine to defend the differential taxation scheme
but a majority of the Court resolved the case on a somewhat broader basis,
determining that the type of law at issue simply did "'not discriminate
against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce
Clause.""83 Relying on the Court's decision in United Haulers Assn., Inc. v.
179. Id. at 88-89.
180. Id. at 89.
181. Id. at 91.
182. Id. at 94.
183. Id. at 1809-10 (quoting United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Harkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007)).
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Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,'"4 which upheld a state
ordinance requiring all solid waste to be processed at a state-owned facility,
Justice Souter stated that, because "[s]tate and local governments that provide
public goods and services on their own, unlike private businesses, are 'vested
with the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of [their]
citizens,' .... a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate
objectives distinct from the simple economic protectionism the Clause
abhors."'85  Thus, when a state is exercising a traditional function such as
waste management or fund raising for public projects, the state may be able to
treat the entities and instruments it creates to effectuate that function more
favorably than counterparts found in the private market or created by
other states.
186
The full import of Dept. of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis is difficult to
assess: Although its language at points sweeps quite broadly, its outcome
must be understood against the reality that "the issuance of debt securities to
pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function," one with a
"venerable history" stretching back to the colonial period.187 Nevertheless,
the fact that a state may constitutionally provide more favorable tax
treatment to a financial instrument that it creates than a similar instrument
created by sister states suggests that the Court might be quite sympathetic
to California's need to protect the regulatory integrity of its GHG emissions
trading system. In both cases, the effectiveness of the associated public
function (i.e., raising public funds, or protecting health and the environ-
ment) depends on the state's ability to treat the relevant financial instrument
as more than a mere commodity. Still, as in the case of state creation and
oversight of corporate entities, the regulatory function must be deployed with
sensitivity to dormant Commerce Clause concerns. Although a full gnalysis
of such concerns is beyond the scope of this Article,' 8 we do note that state
regulatory measures that seek to protect the integrity of GHG emissions
regulations through border adjustments or through selective linkage to
outside programs, in order to maximize their chance of constitutional survival,
must be designed to apply clear, nondiscriminatory criteria, rather than
geographic or territorial limitations. For instance, California's recently
184. 127 S. Ct. 1786.
185. 128 S. Ct. at 1810 (quoting United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795).
186. Id. at 1811 ("There is no forbidden discrimination because Kentucky, as a public entity,
does not have to treat itself as being 'substantially similar' to the other bond issuers in the market.").
187. Id. at 1810.
188. For a more thorough discussion, see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 10654-59.
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adopted interim GHG emissions performance standards for long-term
energy procurement contracts apply identical requirements to all covered
contracts, whether the energy obtained under such contracts comes from an
in-state or out-of-state generator." 9 Such a measure should successfully
escape strict scrutiny, even if it has a greater incidental impact on out-of-
state electricity generators than on in-state generators. In Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 9' for instance, the Court examined a state
law that banned the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable
containers, while allowing sales in pulpwood nonreturnable containers.
The law admittedly benefited in-state pulpwood producers at the expense of
out-of-state plastic producers, but the Court concluded that the statute
"does not discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce,"
since its regulatory distinction effectuated legitimate state interests, rather
than constituting a pretext for protectionism.'
Even if a regulatory scheme does not discriminate on its face or pursue a
protectionist purpose, it may still be challenged simply for imposing an undue
burden on interstate commerce. Under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,192 "[w]here
[a] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits."'93  As the Court has often
reiterated, states may well articulate acceptable health and safety rationales
for regulations that incidentally burden interstate commerce. According to
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska,'94 "[flor
Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a difference between
economic protectionism, on the one hand, and health and safety regulation,
on the other."'95 In applying this principle, the Court has often endorsed
environmental, health, and safety regulatory goals, deeming legitimate a
state's interest in "regulat[ing] the use of water in times and places of shortage
for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens,' 9  a state's "purpose,
189. See CPUC Proceeding, supra 100, at *95-96.
190. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
191. Id. at 472.
192. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
193. Id. at 142.
194. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
195. Id. at 956; see also City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978) ("The
opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an alertness to the evils of 'economic
isolation' and protectionism, while at the same time recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate
commerce may be unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its people.").
196. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
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agreed by all to be commendable as well as legitimate, of protecting [its]
environment," '97 and a state's desire to "protect[] [its] citizens from confu-
sion and deception in the marketing of foodstuffs."'' 8
Nevertheless, because local GHG emissions only lead to local impacts
after first being mediated through complex global atmospheric, oceanic, and
ecological processes, many of which involve centuries-long time scales,"9 a
demand by courts under the Pike test for a particularized demonstration of the
local benefits to be had from state GHG legislation may be tantamount to a
declaration that such benefits do not exist. To be sure, a state's interest in
attempting to avert the adverse impact of climate change upon its populace
received acknowledgment from the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.se In
deciding the question of standing in favor of Massachusetts, Justice Stevens
determined that Massachusetts' interest in the injury caused by climate
change was not dissipated by being "widely shared," and that it could antici-
pate significant harm to its coastline resulting from global warming and
a concomitant rise in sea level.2"' California might therefore, if faced with a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge, legitimately claim that its GHG
emissions regulations further this type of interest by helping to reduce the
threat of climate change, even if only incrementally. 02 Critically, however,
the Court's assessment of state interest in Massachusetts v. EPA was made
in the context of determining whether the state had standing to enforce
the statutory obligations of a federal agency that held national jurisdiction
under the Clean Air Act. Indeed, part of the Court's reasoning in favor of
standing emphasized the limited ability of Massachusetts as a state to lawfully
address the interjurisdictional problems presented by climate change.2 3 Thus,
197. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 US. 794, 809 (1976). But cf. Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 n.16 (claiming that the invocation of an environmental purpose was,
in this case, disingenuous).
198. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
199. H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE & SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND AIR
QUALITY, supra note 45, at 12 ("[Llocal greenhouse gas emissions do not cause local environmental
or health problems, except to the extent that the emissions contribute to global atmos-
pheric concentrations.").
200. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
201. Id. at 1456.
202. See id. at 1457 (rejecting the EPA's argument that standing cannot be met because the
EPA could not by itself, or solely through motor vehicle GHG emissions regulation, arrest global
climate change, since "[algencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one
fell regulatory swoop").
203. Id. at 1454 ("When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot
negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of its
police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted.").
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whether the Court would be similarly solicitous in the dormant Commerce
Clause context remains an open question.
A final complication arises from certain expansive lower court
interpretations of Supreme Court cases that warn against the impermissibility
of state efforts to control conduct that occurs outside of the state's borders,
somewhat akin to the regulatory overreaching problem associated with the
market participant exception. As the Court stated in Healy v. Beer Institute,2
"the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres"
implies that "a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly
outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting
State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterrito-
ria reach was intended by the legislature."20 5 Although the Court has tended
to apply this notion only in the context of state regulations that have the
effect of fixing prices within other jurisdictions, some lower courts have read
it more broadly to discipline all forms of state regulation. 6 While California
could argue that its interim GHG emissions standards for electricity
procurement merely seek to regulate contracts entered into by in-state
entities-and merely do so in order to effectuate the interest of California
citizens in reducing their contribution to global climate change-it is hard
to escape the conclusion that California hopes to utilize its sizable market
power to impact GHG emissions wherever it can. The difficulty in this
context is that California seems to recognize, as it must, that the problem of
GHG emissions cannot be redressed by any single jurisdiction. In defense of the
state's efforts, officials have argued that GHG emissions restrictions
204. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
205. Id. at 336.
206. Compare Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580
(1986) (holding that New York could not require that liquor producers sell within the state at the
lowest price they charge elsewhere in the United States; the state statute impermissibly sought to
"regulate[ I commerce in other states"), and Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935)
(striking down New York's Milk Control Act because a state may not "establish a wage scale or a
scale of prices for use in other states, and ... bar the sale of the products ... unless the scale has been
observed"), with Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 659 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
unconstitutional Wisconsin's ban on out-of-state solid waste disposal at in-state landfills unless this
solid waste originated from a community with a recycling program comparable to Wisconsin's
because of the statute's "extraterritorial scope and.., adverse impact on commerce occurring wholly
outside the enacting state"), and Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cit. 1980) (finding
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that prohibited out-of-state hazardous waste generators from
shipping waste into Oklahoma unless their home state had adopted "substantially similar standards
for controlled waste disposal as those which Oklahoma has enacted"). National Solid Wastes
Management is discussed in detail, infra text accompanying notes 209-214. But cf. Cotto Waxo Co.
v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a Minnesota statute prohibiting sale of
petroleum-based sweeping compounds within the state did not exert impermissible extraterritorial
reach because it left actors free to sell such compounds in other states).
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further domestic state interests by "protect[ing] ratepayers from the costs and
risks of complying with future laws and regulation that will further limit the
emissions of GHG gases," and by "encourag[ing] a wide range of clean energy
sources, which protects the reliability of the grid." ' 7  Artful as this
characterization may be, it still implicitly concedes that California's climate
change policy is premised on the prediction that other governments will
recognize the seriousness of climate change and take strong steps to address
it-a prediction that becomes all the more likely through California's flexing
of its economic muscles behind facially neutral GHG regulations.
Proponents of a strong dormant Commerce Clause approach would
argue that California instead must limit its regulatory oversight to production
processes that occur entirely within its borders, leaving other states to decide
for themselves whether in-state electricity generators should begin to reduce
their GHG emissions before Congress acts. Although under this approach
California citizens would likely continue to suffer the moral taint of
purchasing electricity that was produced through less environmentally
stringent processes, their complaint-the argument goes-should be directed
at the national Congress rather than embodied in conditional importation
rules that exert a coercive influence over other states and that might
therefore foster retaliation and resentment across borders."' This strong view was
exemplified in National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, °" where
the Seventh Circuit faced a Wisconsin recycling statute that blocked waste
generators from using state landfills unless their waste originated from a
region that had adopted an "effective recycling program," defined by the
statute to include detailed public education, waste sorting, waste reduction,
equipment, and other guidelines set by Wisconsin."' The court held that
strict scrutiny applied to the Wisconsin statute, despite its evenhandedness
with respect to in-state and out-of-state waste generators, because it
"condition[ed] the use of Wisconsin landfills by non-Wisconsin waste genera-
tors on their home communities' adoption and enforcement of Wisconsin
recycling standards. '.. The court was especially piqued by the statute's effect
that "all persons in [a] non-Wisconsin community must adhere to the
207. CPUC Proceeding, supra 100, at *98.
208. Cf. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The ProcesslProduct Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004) (addressing an analogous argument
in the international trade context).
209. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt., 63 F.3d 652.
210. Id. at 654.
211. ld. at 658.
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Wisconsin standards whether or not they dump their waste in Wisconsin, 2
or indeed whether or not their community adhered to standards that were
more environmentally stringent than Wisconsin's. In light of alternative
regulatory means that were perceived to be available to achieve the state's
goal of sorting and recycling inbound solid waste, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that Wisconsin's real ambition was to coerce its sister states into
joining the recycling bandwagon precisely on Wisconsin's terms."'
National Solid Wastes Management Association represents only a single
opinion from a Circuit that has been particularly aggressive in applying
dormant Commerce Clause restrictions. As noted above, the Supreme
Court's cases have tended merely to sanction state regulations that seek to
manipulate prices beyond their borders, rather than to effectuate other
regulatory goals such as environmental, health, and safety protection.
Nevertheless, the National Solid Wastes Management Association court's
disposition does suggest one possible way to thread the needle in the context
of differential environmental production standards: Out-of-state actors could
segregate their production streams, applying heightened environmental
standards for articles of commerce that are intended for California (or
Wisconsin), while meeting their home state's lower standards for other
articles that they produce. In that manner, consumers in the more stringent
jurisdiction would not suffer the moral taint of importing the fruits of
production processes that they had legislated or regulated against domestically,
out-of-state producers who would compete on an even-handed basis
with in-state producers within the more stringent jurisdiction, and sister
jurisdictions would not be forced as a practical matter to adopt the more
212. Id. Echoing concerns raised by Zschernig in the international context, the court also
seemed troubled by the fact that the statute directed the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources to engage in an inquiry regarding whether community recycling programs of other
jurisdictions were "[aldequate[ly] enforce[d]." Id. at 655. Specifically, the statute directed the
Department to "promulgate rules for comparing the programs of non-Wisconsin municipalities to
Wisconsin municipalities or counties," including such factors as "the level of financing, enforcement
mechanisms and effort, and the number of materials being separated and recycled." Id. Although
the Seventh Circuit did not specifically rely on these features of the Wisconsin statute in striking
it down, the court did seem troubled by the possibility that out-of-state waste might be banned "not
because it is more noxious than waste produced the Wisconsin way, but simply because it comes
from a community whose ways are not Wisconsin's ways." Id. at 662.
213. The Seventh Circuit indicated that Wisconsin could have achieved its waste management
goals simply by requiring all out-of-state solid waste to undergo sorting at a materials recovery facility.
See id. at 662. Even though this approach would have treated waste generated out-of-state
differently from in-state waste (which would still benefit from an exemption from sorting
due to the Wisconsin community recycling program), the court suggested that it would pass
constitutional muster.
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stringent jurisdiction's standards."4 In the case of electricity generation, such
segregation could in fact be readily accomplished through what is known as
"contract shuffling." '  Out-of-state generators, which typically have a range
of electricity sources from which to draw when fulfilling supply contracts,
could simply allocate all of their clean energy sources to California purchasers,
while fulfilling non-California contract obligations with dirty energy.
As the Market Advisory Committee noted in its report, however, this
apparent solution hardly fulfills the actual ambition of California's climate
change program, which is not simply to avoid moral taint, but to reduce GHG
emissions from existing levels."6 Nor is California's overall climate change
ambition simply to reduce its own emissions, since very little tangible
environmental effect would come from such a reduction in the absence of
comparable restrictions outside the state; instead, California's "desire [is] to
inspire others to act."'217 Still, whether such a desire can be realized within
a nationally integrated economy in a practicable manner consistent with the
dictates of the dormant Commerce Clause remains an open question. At
bottom, the question of whether a state measure impermissibly reaches across
borders is a question about what kinds of disparities in production processes
should count as natural competitive advantages that sister states may not
constitutionally seek to eliminate through border adjustments. In the interna-
tional context, trade jurisprudence is evolving toward a system in which
equalizing regulations will be upheld as nonprotectionist so long as the regulating
jurisdiction can show some legitimate connection to the environmental,
health, or safety good at issue and also can show some sincere attempts at a
214. Such an approach would be conceptually similar to a compensatory tax, which the Court
has on occasion upheld as an acceptable exercise of state authority to level the playing field between
intra- and interstate commerce. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93,
102-03 (1994) ("[Interstate commerce may be made to 'pay its way'.... [A] facially discriminatory
tax that imposes on interstate commerce the rough equivalent of an identifiable and 'substantially
similar' tax on intrastate commerce does not offend the negative Commerce Clause."); Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 585 (1937) (accepting the constitutionality of a compensating use
tax whereby Washington sought to make up for lost sales tax revenue from in-state use of products
purchased out of state, and distinguishing Seelig by stating, in that case, "New York was attempting to
project its legislation within the borders of another state by regulating the price to be paid in that
state for milk acquired there"); see also Heddy Bolster, Note, The Commerce Clause Meets
Environmental Protection: The Compensatory Tax Doctrine as a Defense of Potential Regional Carbon
Dioxide Regulation, 47 B.C. L. REV. 737 (2006).
215. See MARKET ADVISORY COMM., supra note 38, at 44.
216. See id. ("[Slome observers are concerned that contract shuffling could dramatically
undermine a California cap-and-trade program: they note that there is sufficient generation capacity
within the eleven states in the western power interconnect to entirely comply with expected
emission reductions in California without any real change in generation.").
217. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 10658.
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multilateral resolution."8 In the domestic context, on the other hand, states
have few resources from within dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence with
which to justify unilateral economic measures in furtherance of environmen-
tally interdependent goals. In the oft-quoted words of Justice Cardozo, "[tihe
Constitution was framed... upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division.
219
CONCLUSION
In this Article we have mainly been interested in asking, as a doctrinal
matter, whether state climate change multilateralism passes constitutional
muster, putting aside its broader normative and political implications. We must
acknowledge, however, that from a certain perspective the constitutionality of
Schwarzenegger's globetrotting on behalf of the environment may be beside the
point. That is, Schwarzenegger and other state actors may have compelling
reasons for pursuing policies that they well know would fail to withstand
constitutional challenge. Whether or not it is lawful, California's threat to
create a binding GHG emissions reduction scheme, with its attendant
disruption of economic activity and the specter that it raises of an ensuing
patchwork of inconsistent or competing regulatory schemes, has the effect of
bolstering support for uniform regulation at the federal level. Believing that
national action on climate change has been wrongfully and dangerously
withheld at the behest of industry and its entrenched political champions,
California and its indomitable executive leader have engaged in a course of
action that is perhaps best thought of as a form of state civil disobedience.
Like individual civil disobedience-"an act of protest, deliberately
unlawful, conscientiously and publicly performed" 22-California's climate
change strategy involves enormous short-term costs to the state, but offers the
hope of inspiring longer-term systematic change. By unilaterally committing
to reduce its GHG emissions in advance of other jurisdictions, California has
taken a stance that, unless it inspires other jurisdictions to follow suit, will
possibly only succeed in harming the state's economy without achieving
much of anything in the way of climate stability. As such, California's
approach appears to be individually irrational when evaluated from the
narrow perspective of classical game theory, with its assumption of purely
218. See Kysar, supra note 208.
219. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
220. CARL COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TAcTIcs, AND THE LAW 39-40 (1971).
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self-interested and noncommunicative human institutions and actors. On
the other hand, when seen through a thicker, more socialized lens, in which
individuals and states are believed to be capable of engaging in dialogue
and mutual redefinition of interests, California's apparent irrationality may
have a grander logic, offering the prospect of eventually achieving collective
rationality in an inverse manner to the classic tragedy of the commons
scenario, in which individually rational behavior unravels hopelessly into
collective irrationality.
Significantly, although California has willfully declared itself to be a
nation state, its vision of a collaborative and sustainable climate future
is open to all jurisdictions that desire to follow. In words attributed to
Mahatma Ghandi, of one of history's greatest practitioners of civil disobedi-
ence, California is attempting to "be the change that [it] want[s] to see in the
world," rather than waiting for the world's major actors to concurrently agree
to change. To be sure, whether this inspire-and-lead strategy is more likely
than a carrots-and-sticks strategy to engage key developing nations in climate
action is a foreign policy judgment that the Constitution generally entrusts to
the political branches of the federal government. Nevertheless, in the
absence of an express or otherwise unequivocal statement of preemption by
those branches, courts would be wise to construe their precedents narrowly
to permit state civil disobedience on climate change. By its nature, California's
stance on climate change does not fit into a domestic-foreign construction. It
cannot be characterized as one or the other, because it recognizes that much
of the meaning of the climate change policy problem rests in the artificial
division of human interests that is created by political territoriality. Far from
being an embarrassment to the nation, therefore, California's dissenting voice
is regarded by many international observers as a primary reason for believing
that climate change-the greatest tragedy of the commons the world has ever
seen-might have a Hollywood ending.
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